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Abstract: In the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, Japan, on 
the one hand, strives to evade the relations of its acquisition of “sovereignty” over 
these islands with the Treaty of Shimonoseki; on the other hand, it assumes that the 
Diaoyu Islands is a part of Ryukyu under its administrative system, and Ryukyu 
constitutes a part of Japanese territory, therefore, Japan has the sovereignty of the 
Diaoyu Islands. In this regard, Japan’s absurd logic lies in that “the Diaoyu Islands 
belongs to Ryukyu, and the latter belongs to Japan, hence the Diaoyu Islands 
belongs to Japan”. This paper attempts to eliminate the misstatements about the 
status of Ryukyu, by examining the status of pre-modern Ryukyu (1609-1879) 
in history and international law, and the marine boundaries between China and 
Ryukyu in history. In doing so, the paper further demonstrates that the Diaoyu 
Islands is an inherent part of China, thereby providing compelling evidences to 
support China’s claim to the sovereignty of these islands. 
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The Japanese government attempted to purchase the Diaoyu Islands in 2012. 
Since this “farce” staged by the Japanese side concerning the Sino-Japanese
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disputes over Diaoyu Islands,1 the tensions between the two States escalated, and an 
acrimonious standoff between them still continues. In Chinese academia, especially 
in Chinese Mainland, few studies have paid enough attention to Ryukyu when 
examining Japanese claims to the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. The debate 
on Ryukyu,2 becomes more heated during the tense standoff following the Japanese 
move to “purchase the Diaoyu Islands” in 2012. The issue of the sovereignty over 
the Diaoyu Islands is intertwined with the status of the Ryukyu Islands. We should 
eliminate the misstatements about the status of Ryukyu. In other words, when 
discussing whether the sovereignty over Ryukyu rests with Japan, if we fortify 
China’s claims to the Diaoyu Islands from the perspectives of history, geography 
and international law, and rationally and forcefully refute Japan’s claims based on 
the subordination of the Diaoyu Islands to Ryukyu3 with convincible facts, then we 
can reject Japan’s claims with its own arguments.
I. The History of Ryukyu and Its Relationship with 
    China and Japan
Ryukyu is an ancient kingdom with a long historical and cultural tradition. 
1  　 Diaoyu Islands is also called “Diaoyu Dao” or “Diaoyutai” in China, or “Senkaku Islands” 
in Japan. Except as otherwise stated herein, the term Diaoyu Islands is used throughout this 
paper to refer to Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islets. 
2　  In recent years, concerns over the sovereignty of Ryukyu grew quickly in Chinese civil 
society. Calls for the “restoration of Ryukyu Kingdom” appeared in the internet social 
media. In Chinese academia, Xu Yong, Tang Chunfeng and other scholars also argue that 
the status of Ryukyu is uncertain. This argument, first raised by Taiwanese scholars, rose 
to prominence in Chinese Mainland around 2012, which sparked the attention of media in 
Japan and Okinawa. Sino-Japanese relations have become strained after Japan’s move to 
“nationalize” the Diaoyu Islands. On 8 May 2012, People’s Daily, the official newspaper of 
China, published an article titled “The Treaty of Shimonoseki and the Diaoyu Dao Issue”, 
by Zhang Haipeng and Li Guoqiang. This article, in its conclusion, says that “it is the high 
time to reconsider the pending issue of Ryukyu.” As to the position of Chinese government 
toward Ryukyu, a Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman asserted, “Chinese government has 
never changed its position to some relevant issues. The history of Okinawa and Ryukyu is 
a long-time concern in the academia, which stood up again recently, against the backdrop 
where the territorial sovereignty of China was jeopardized by Japan’s provocative acts 
concerning the Diaoyu Islands issue. The articles by scholars reflect the concerns and 
studies on the Diaoyu Islands and the relevant historical issues by Chinese civil society and 
academia”.
3　   Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku 
Islands, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/basic_view.html, 8 October 
2016; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Senkaku Islands Q&A, at http://www.mofa.
go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html, 8 October 2016.
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With its thriving trade, the kingdom was known as a trade transit center in 
Northeast and Southeast Asia, which earned itself a reputation of “Bridge of 
Nations”. The geographical boundary of the kingdom is greatly different from that 
of today’s Okinawa Prefecture. However, as time goes by, Ryukyuan tributary 
relations with China is lesser known to the modern generation. Ryukyu was a 
kingdom having its unique history before 1879, when it was formally annexed by 
Meiji Japanese government. Ryukyuan history was briefly divided into three times: 
the primeval, the ancient and the pre-modern times. The primeval Ryukyu includes 
the old stone age and the shell mound age. The ancient Ryukyu starts with the early 
12th century and ends with the invasion of the Ryukyu Kingdom by the Shimazu 
clan of Satsuma Domain4 in 1609, spanning 500 years. And the pre-modern Ryukyu 
covers a period of 270 years, beginning from Satsuma’s invasion of Ryukyu in 
1609 until 1879, when the Meiji government abolished the Ryukyu Kingdom and 
transformed it into the Okinawa Prefecture.5
A. The History of Ryukyu Kingdom and the Tributary Relations 
    between Ryukyu and China
From the unification of the Ryukyu Kingdom in 1429, to the annexation 
of the kingdom by Japan in 1879, the Ryukyu Kingdom spans two periods, i.e., 
the ancient and the pre-modern Ryukyu. King Satto became, in 1372, the first 
Ryukyuan king to submit to Chinese suzerainty. Investiture (cefeng) mission 
confirmed Satto as king of Chūzan. From 1372 to 1879, when the Ryukyu Kingdom 
was annexed and transformed into Okinawa Prefecture by Japan, the tributary 
relations between China and Ryukyu had been maintained for more than 500 years. 
In all, investiture missions were undertaken 24 times during the Ming and Qing 
4 　 Satsuma Domain is the local authority controlling the southern Kyushu Island before 
the Meiji Government replaced its feudal domain system with prefecture system. It is 
associated with the provinces of Satsuma in the western modern-day Kagoshima Prefecture, 
Osumi in the eastern modern-day Kagoshima Prefecture and Osumi Islands, and Hyūga in 
southwestern modern-day Miyazaki Prefecture. After the creation of the Tokugawa regime 
in the Edo period (1603-1868), this authority became the Satsuma Domain, which was 
formally named the Kagoshima Domain following the Meiji Restoration. See Sadafumi 
Fujii and Rokurō Hayashi, Hanshi Jiten, Tokyo: Akita Shoten, 1976, p. 342, quoted from 
Yuan Jiadong, The Japanese Satsuma Invasion of Ryukyu and the Changes in East Asian 
Geopolitics, Social Sciences in China, No. 8, 2013, p. 189. (in Chinese)
5　  He Ciyi, The History of the Relations between Ryukyu and Japan in Ming and Qing 
Dynasties, Nanjing: Jiangsu Ancient Books Publishing House Co. Ltd., 2002, pp. 3~5. (in 
Chinese) 
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Dynasties.6 Ryukyu Kingdom sent more envoys to China.7 Since the establishment 
of diplomatic relations between the two States, upon the accession of a new king 
after the death of an old king, Chinese envoys would be dispatched to perform 
investiture ceremonies for the new king, formally acknowledging him as king 
on behalf of the Chinese Imperial Court. Only after the performance of imperial 
investitures, can the king officially declare himself to the world as the king of 
Ryukyu.8 Historical descriptions of the Diaoyu Islands can mostly be found in the 
detailed written reports submitted by the envoys to the Ming and Qing Emperors 
about their journeys upon return to China.
B. Issue concerning Ryukyu’s Dual Subordination to China and Japan 
    in the Context of Multilateral Relationship among the Three States
The period between 1609 (the year Ryukyu was invaded by the Satsuma 
Domain) and 1879 (the year that the Ryukyu Domain was abolished and 
transformed into a prefecture by the Meiji Government), is called “a period of 
dual subordination” in Ryukyuan history by historians. In 1609, the Shimazu clan 
6  　 There is little debate, among the Chinese and Japanese scholars, over the times that the 
Qing Court sent imperial envoys to Ryukyu. It is generally maintained that the Qing Court 
sent envoys 8 times to perform investiture ceremony for Ryukyuan kings, involving 16 
envoys in all. However, historians failed to reach a consensus over the total times that 
China dispatched envoys to Ryukyu in the two dynasties of Ming and Qing. It is generally 
believed to be 24 times, but some scholars also assert that it is 23 times. The main 
difference lies in their different views on the times of investiture missions sent in the Ming 
Dynasty. Xie Bizhen, Wu Shangqing and Akamine Seiki all believe that the Ming Court 
sent investiture missions 15 times, involving 27 envoys; in contrast, Fang Baochuan asserts 
that the numbers are 14 (times) and 26 (envoys) respectively. Some scholars contend that 
the times of investiture missions should be determined on whether the central government 
has sent envoys to perform investiture ceremony for Ryukyuan King on the land of the 
kingdom, therefore, the mission carried out by Yang Zai should not be counted, and the 
Ming and Qing Courts sent envoys 23 times, rather than 24 times to Ryukyu to perform 
investiture rituals for its kings. See Xie Bizhen and Hu Xin, Historical Data and Research 
on the History of Sino-Ryukyuan Relations, Beijing: China Ocean Press, 2010, pp. 125~126 
(in Chinese); Xu Bin, Literati and Officialdom in Ming and Qing Dynasties and Ryukyu, 
Beijing: China Ocean Press, 2011, p. 83. (in Chinese)
7　  Veritable Records of Emperor Ming Taizu (Vol. 71) stated, the imperial edict that Ming 
Taizu, also known as the Hongwu Emperor, ordered Yang Zai to carry along to confirm 
King Satto as king of Chūzan said: “only your country Ryukyu, which is located to the 
southeast of China and far away in the oversea land, was not informed of the news. 
Therefore, now I send my envoys to tell you the news.” See Veritable Records of Emperor 
Ming Taizu, Vol. 71, 16 January 1372 (lunar calendar).
8　    Xu Bin, Literati and Officialdom in Ming and Qing Dynasties and Ryukyu, Beijing: China 
Ocean Press, 2011, p. 36. (in Chinese)
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of the Satsuma Domain dispatched troops to invade Ryukyu, and Ryukyuan King 
Shō Nei and his councilors were taken prisoner. This battle is known to history as 
“Satsuma Invasion of Ryukyu 1609”. After the battle, Ryukyu was subordinated to 
China nominally but to Japan technically and secretly.9 This situation continued to 
the early years of Meiji Restoration. In the Chinese Qing Dynasty, the late Second 
Shō Dynasty of Ryukyu began, during which Ryukyu requested Chinese Qing 
Court for investiture. Shô Hô, then known as Prince Sashiki Chôshô, filed petitions 
to Chinese Imperial Court for investiture in 1625, 1626 and 1627 respectively. 
Such petitions were made under the secret control of Satsuma Domain after the 
“Satsuma Invasion of Ryukyu 1609”.10 Thereafter, constantly pushed by Satsuma 
Domain, Ryukyu restored its tributary and trade relations with China in 1633. In 
September 1872, the Meiji Emperor issued an imperial decree, granting the royal 
linage of Ryukyu the title “seignior, and included them in the kazoku of Japan”.11 
This decree set the stage for Japan’s annexation of Ryukyu, which was formally 
annexed by Japan in 1879. The facts mentioned above explain the origin of the dual 
subordination of Ryukyu. 
Following the Satsuma invasion of Ryukyu, Satsuma controlled the kingdom 
politically and economically. However, in order to gain benefits from the tributary 
and trade relations between Ryukyu and China, Satsuma made great efforts to 
obscure its domination of Ryukyu from the Chinese Court. The measures Satsuma 
took in this regard include: a). to forbid Ryukyu from adopting Japanese system, 
and the Ryukyuans from adopting Japanese names, so that Chinese envoys would 
not discover the real relations between Satsuma and Ryukyu. For example, Ji Kao 
(A Research) said that, on 20 August 1624, the premier (the Satsuma Domain 
internally called itself a State) was appointed to serve in Ryukyu according to 
an imperial decree; thereafter, Ryukyuan hierarchical court system and criminal 
law and policies would be decided by the Ryukyu king himself; Ryukyuans were 
forbidden from adopting Japanese names, clothes, or customs.12 b). During the stay 
of Chinese envoys in Ryukyu, for the sake of hiding truths from Chinese envoys, 
9  　 Zheng Hailin, The History of Diaoyu Islands and the Relevant Jurisprudence (Revised and 
Enlarged Edition), Hong Kong: Ming Pao Publications Ltd., 2011, p. 124. (in Chinese)
10　 Xu Bin, Literati and Officialdom in Ming and Qing Dynasties and Ryukyu, Beijing: China 
Ocean Press, 2011, p. 4. (in Chinese)
11　 Mi Qingyu, A Research on Ryukyuan History, Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 
1998, pp. 112~114. (in Chinese)
12　 Yang Chungkui, Ancient and Modern Ryukyu, and the Issue of Diaoyutai, Taipei: The 
Commercial Press, Ltd., 1990, pp. 64~65. (in Chinese)
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Satsuma required all Japanese officials residing in Ryukyu, including zaibanbugyou 
and yamatoyokome, if not properly camouflaged, to move to some remote places on 
east coast of Ryukyu, which were far away from the west coastal areas frequented 
by Chinese; also, Satsuma banned all posters and shop signs written in Japanese; 
moreover, it required all books, records and reports not to mention the relationship 
between Japan and Ryukyu in the “Satsuma Invasion of Ryukyu 1609”.13 c. The 
authorities of Ryukyu compiled and published some books or documents, which 
included, among others, Questions & Answers about Ryukyu and Experiences of 
a Traveler. Questions & Answers about Ryukyu is a list of questions and answers 
developed under the auspice of the king residing in Shuri, with an aim to prevent 
the “Ryukyuan castaways”14 from telling Satsuma’s technical control of Ryukyu. 
In this list, the first question is about the territory ruled by the Ryukyuan king. 
The answer given to this question is: “the territory includes three principalities: 
Chūzan, Nanzan and Hokuzan, and 36 islands, including Yaeyama and Yonaguni-
jima islands in the south, Amami-Ōshima and Kikaigashima in the north, Kume 
Island in the west, and Ikei and Tsuken Islands in the east”. However, at that time, 
Amami-Ōshima and Kikaigashima were actually under the jurisdiction of Satsuma 
Domain. Obviously, it deliberately concealed this situation from the Chinese Qing 
Court.15 Experiences of a Traveler, published in 1759, is a pamphlet by a Chinese-
Ryukyuan politician named Cai Wen, which is full of standard answers to questions 
regarding China and Ryukyu. It aims to tell the Ryukyuan officials, students whose 
fathers are officials, and ordinary businessmen in China how to reply to questions 
13     Yang Chungkui, Ancient and Modern Ryukyu, and the Issue of Diaoyutai, Taipei: The 
Commercial Press, Ltd., 1990, pp. 64~65. (in Chinese)
14　 Ryukyuan castaways incidents: since the establishment of tributary relations between China 
and Ryukyu in the Ming Dynasty, 12 Ryukyuan ships or ships used for tribute missions had 
been wrecked and wandered into the coastal areas of China. Both the Qing and Ming Courts 
had the practice of salvaging and resettling the castaways, including those from Ryukyu, 
granting pensions to them, and sending them back to their home countries. Such practices 
formed a sino-centric marine salvage mechanism, with participation from its tributary 
and non-tributary States (such as Japan). Since the shipwrecks were caused mainly by the 
miscalculation of the monsoon season, in the period of dual subordination, Shuri Royal 
Government ordered its subjects to strictly follow the right time to leave or return to its 
ports. Even in that case, shipwreck incidents still happened. See Lai Zhengwei, A Research 
on the Sino-Ryukyuan Relations in the Qing Dynasty, Beijing: China Ocean Press, 2011, 
pp. 56~60 (in Chinese); [Japan] Murata Tadayoshi, The Origin of Sino-Japanese Territorial 
Disputes: the Diaoyu Islands Issue Seen from Historical Archives, translated by Wei Pinghe, 
Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2013, p. 52. (in Chinese)
15　 [Japan] Murata Tadayoshi, The Origin of Sino-Japanese Territorial Disputes: the Diaoyu 
Islands Issue Seen from Historical Archives, translated by Wei Pinghe, Beijing: Social 
Sciences Academic Press (China), 2013, pp. 52~53. (in Chinese)
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that Chinese people may raise, most importantly, the questions concerning the 
relationship between Satsuma and Ryukyu.16　    
II. The Status of a Vassal State in International Law: 
      A Perspective from Elements of International Law
The Asian tributary system was a China-centered international structure 
featured by suzerain-vassal relations between China and its neighbors. The system 
of the law of nations, also known as the treaty system, is an international system 
based on the international order in the world upholding the law of nations, which 
is a network of treaty relations dominated by the Western colonial powers shaped 
during the colonial expansion in modern times.17 Western modern international law 
was first formally and systematically introduced into China in the 19th century. 
However, in the late 19th century, when Vietnam, Burma, Korea and other vassal 
States of Qing Court turned into colonies and protectorate of occidental powers and 
Japan, the tributary system disbanded. 
A. The Introduction of Elements of International Law into China and 
     Its Influences on the Diplomacy of Qing Government
As mentioned above, Western modern international law was first formally 
and systematically introduced into China in the 19th century. The Chinese edition 
of Elements of International Law,18 which was translated by William A. P. Martin 
(1827-1916), an American missionary to China, was the first work on Western 
jurisprudence in Chinese history. When first published in China, the book caused 
16    Yang Chungkui, Ancient and Modern Ryukyu, and the Issue of Diaoyutai, Taipei: The 
Commercial Press, Ltd., 1990, pp. 64~65. (in Chinese)
17　 The term “treaty system”, which coexisted with the tributary system in late Qing Dynasty, 
was proposed by Fairbank. See J. K. Fairbank, The Early Treaty System in the Chinese 
World Order, in J. K. Fairbank ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign 
Relations, Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press, 1969, pp. 257~275. 
18　 The Chinese version of Elements of International Law (named “ 万国公法 ” in Chinese) 
is translated by William A. P. Martin (1827-1916), an American missionary, from its 
English version, which was published by the American publicist Henry Wheaton (1785-
1848) in 1836. This Chinese version was printed by Beijing Chongshi School in the winter 
of 1864. See Lin Xuezhong, From Elements of International Law to Diplomacy Based on 
International Law: the Reception, Interpretation, and Application of International Law 
in the Late Qing, Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing House, 2009, p. 113. (in 
Chinese) 
China Oceans Law Review (Vol. 2016 No. 2)116
a stir in the East Asia. In the following year, recarved and kunten-marked editions 
appeared in Japan, which became one of Japanese bestsellers in a short time. Sub-
sequent editions also appeared in Korea and Vietnam.19 In the early 19th century, 
China became a country occidental powers plotted to colonize in East Asia. China 
was afterwards drawn into the Opium Wars. In 1901 when the Boxer Protocol 
was signed, China completely turned into a semi-colonial and semi-feudal 
country. Against this backdrop, the attitudes towards the introduction of Western 
international law into China are sometimes contradictory among different social 
strata in China. On one hand, cases really existed where the Qing Government won 
in diplomatic negotiations against Western countries by applying international law, 
such as Lin Zexu’s prohibition of the sale of opium20 and the handling of Lin Weixi 
Case21 in 1839, and the settlement of the dispute concerning Prussia’s seizure of 
Danish ships in Chinese territorial sea;22 to some extent, the successful resolution 
of these diplomatic disputes led to Qing Government’s quick approval of the 
printing of Elements of International Law. On the other hand, Qing Government 
and its officials inclined to use international law as an instrument, seeking to invoke 
relevant rules to defeat foreigners in diplomatic negotiations. 
The international community, in the wake of the First Sino-Japanese War 
(1894-1895), has its unique connotation. This community, also called an “interna-
tional law community” or “civilized community”, is a Euro-centric binding system 
19    Zou Zhenhuan, A Comparative Study on the Distribution of the Elements of International 
Law Translated by W. A. P. Martin in China, Japan and Korea, in Center for South Korea 
Studies of Fudan University ed., South Korea Studies, Vol. 7, Beijing: China Social Sciences 
Press, 2000, pp. 258~278. (in Chinese)
20    Mao Haijian, Collapse of the Celestial Empire: A Re-examination on the Opium Wars, 
Beijing: Joint Publishing, 1995, pp. 104~112. (in Chinese)
21     In July 1839, a local named Lin Weixi in the village of Tsim Sha Tsui was beaten to death 
by a British sailor. For research on this incident, see Lam Kai-yin and Lam Kam-yuen, On 
the Approaches and Attitudes of the Chinese and British Governments in Dealing with the 
Lin Weixi Incident, Historical Research, No. 2, 2000, pp. 97~113. (in Chinese)  
22　 In April 1864, when the Prussian minister H. Von Rehfues came to China by the warship 
Gazelle, he, without causes, captured three Danish commercial ships in the waters of Dagu 
Port, Tianjin, China. Zongli Yamen (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) of Qing China protested 
against Prussia’s act immediately, by invoking international legal concepts. The Prussian 
minister was accused of capturing Danish ships in Chinese “inner ocean” (or “territorial 
sea”), over which China had jurisdiction. The Prussians were further informed that should 
the ships not be released then China could refuse a reception to their officials. Ultimately, 
Prussia released two of the captured ships, and paid a compensation at the amount of $1500. 
This incident was thus settled peacefully. For the details of this incident and the invocation 
of international law by Qing Court, see Wang Weijian, Prussian-Danish Incident in Dagu 
Port and the Introduction of Western International Law into China, Academic Research, No. 
5, 1985, pp. 84~90. (in Chinese)
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of rules of modern international law, which is composed of European sovereign 
States, reflecting Western values. Kikoh Nishizato, a historian with University 
of the Ryukyus, stated that the modern East Asia has undergone an era where the 
relationship between the East Asian States and nations and occidental powers was 
reversed, and also an era where the traditional international system in East Asia, i.e., 
the tributary system, was replaced by the modern international order dominated by 
the occidental powers, which was also known as the system of the law of nations.23 
Chinese professor Wang Hui contended that, the conflicts between Chinese Qing 
Court and European powers were not ordinary inter-State conflicts, but rather 
those between two world (or international) systems and their rules.24 Here, the two 
systems refer to the tributary system and the modern system of the law of nations 
respectively. In the latter system, the world was divided into civilized, partially 
civilized, barbarous and savage States (Table 1). Being considered as “barbarous 
States”, China and other Asian States were not full legal persons as States, where 
only partial principles of international law could be applied. Such differentiation of 
States rights under this international order can be best explained by those unequal 
treaties, whose principal provisions include unilateral most-favoured-nation 
treatment, consular jurisdiction and agreement tariff. Such an international order 
is utterly based on Euro-centrism. However, in the political arena in the late 19th 
century and the early 20th century, everything was staged exactly under this kind of 
prejudice.25
23　 [Japan] Kikoh Nishizato, A Study on the History of Relations between Ryukyu and Japan 
in the Late Qing Dynasty (I), translated by Hu Liancheng et al., Beijing: Social Sciences 
Academic Press (China), 2010, p. 17. (in Chinese) 
24　 Wang Hui, The Rise of Modern Chinese Thoughts, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 
2004, p. 680. (in Chinese)
25　 Lin Xuezhong, From Elements of International Law to Diplomacy Based on International 
Law: the Reception, Interpretation, and Application of International Law in the Late Qing, 
Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing House, 2009, p. 243. (in Chinese)
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B. Tributary/Vassal States Defined in the Elements of International Law
A comparison of two masterpieces in international law – Elements of Interna-
tional Law written in the 19th century and Oppenheim’s International Law27 in the
20th century, shows that “colony” is one category of the “international persons” 
in modern international law. The international law concepts closely related to the 
tributary system, such as “protectorate”, “half sovereign State” and “tributary 
State”, were discussed in the chapter “Nations and Sovereign States” under the 
Elements of International Law. An “international person”, in the modern interna-
tional law, is one who possesses legal personality in international law, meaning one 
who is a subject of international law so as itself to enjoy rights, duties or powers 
established in international law.28 An analysis of the meaning and evolutions of the
concept “international person” in modern international law would provides some 
important insights into the discussion on the status of Ryukyu in modern interna-
tional law. With regards to the status of Ryukyu, authorities have invoked and 
applied the principles, rules and theories embodied in the Elements of International 
Law in the diplomatic negotiations between China, Japan and Ryukyu.
In order to understand the categories and meaning of international persons 
in the 19th century, we need to trace the concept back to its origin – Elements of 
27   Oppenheim’s International Law is considered as another internationally renowned book, 
following the Elements of International Law, in the 20th century. This book finds its early 
form in the two volumes of International Law: A Treatise initially published in 1905-
1906, by the internationalist L. F. L. Oppenheim (1858-1919). This work won him enough 
prestige to be appointed as the Whewell Professor of International Law in the University 
of Cambridge. The second edition of the book was revised by Oppenheim himself. 
Oppenheim’s International Law was afterwards edited by Ronald Francis Roxburgh, 
Arnold Duncan McNair, Hersch Lauterpacht and other renowned scholars of international 
law, and is known as a “Cambridge Monograph”. Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts eds., 
Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. 1, No. 1, translated by Wang Tieya et al., Beijing: 
Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 1998, pp. III~V. (in Chinese)
28    Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts eds., Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. 1, No. 1, 
translated by Wang Tieya et al., Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 1998, p. 
90. (in Chinese)
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International Law. From its Chinese edition translated by William A. P. Martin29 
and the eighth English edition published by Little, Brown and Company, a 
publisher based on Boston, in 1866,30 we can find that Wheaton’s Elements of 
International Law31 mentioned, in Volume I, Chapter II, “State”, “semi-sovereign 
State”, “protectorate”, “vassal State” and other categories enjoying full or partial 
international personality. Particularly, the discussion on the sovereignty of a vassal 
State in this book deserves our attention.
Quoting the words of Cicero, Elements of International Law defined “a 
State to be, a body of politic, or society of men, united together for the purpose 
of promoting their mutual safety and advantage by their combined strength.” In 
order to explain the requisite of a State, Wheaton added, “the legal idea of a State 
necessarily implies that of the habitual obedience of its members to those persons 
in whom the superiority is vested, and of a fixed abode, and definite territory 
29　 It is noteworthy that, Prof. He Qinhua, the proofreader of the Chinese version of Elements 
of International Law (Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2003) 
stated, William A. P. Martin’s translation was abridged and adjusted from the original 
work, with some contents deleted and its structure, style or chapters adjusted. For example, 
nearly 90% of original words of Volume 1, Chapter 2, Section 23 (titled “Germanic 
Confederation”) were deleted by William in his translation, only retaining a summary. 
Additionally, subject to the historical conditions and the translator’s Chinese proficiency, 
the Chinese version is fraught with translation errors. See Henry Wheaton, Elements of 
International Law, translated by William A. P. Martin, proofread by He Qinhua, Beijing: 
China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2003, Preface by Proofreader, p. 51 
(in Chinese). By virtue of it, the paper pays a special attention to the difference between 
the Chinese and English versions, particularly those parts deleted or omitted in the Chinese 
version.
30　  The National Library of China collected several editions of Elements of International Law 
in its House of Foreign Literature. This book has been reprinted many times since its first 
publication in 1836. The main contents of this book remained unchanged, but with notes 
or international conventions added by editors as appendix. The author referred to the 8th 
edition published in Boston in 1866, edited with notes, by Richard Henry Dana. See Henry 
Wheaton, Elements of International Law, edited, with notes, by Richard Henry Dana, 
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1866, p. viii. 
31　 William A. P. Martin’s translation of Elements of International Law was published in 1864 
by Beijing Chongshi School. This Chinese edition is translated from the 6th edition of 
Elements of International Law: With a Sketch of the History of the Science, which was 
edited with notes by William Beach Lawrence (1800-1881) (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1855). See Lin Xuezhong, From Elements of International Law to Diplomacy 
Based on International Law: the Reception, Interpretation, and Application of International 
Law in the Late Qing, Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing House, 2009, p. 113. 
(in Chinese)
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belonging to the people by whom it is occupied.”32 In the international law of the 
19th century, the indispensible requisites of a State include persons of fixed abode, 
definite territory and borders,33 which are much easier to meet than those requisites 
set in modern international law. Elements of International Law divided States into 
sovereign and semi-sovereign ones. A sovereign State means “a community or a 
number of persons permanently organized under a sovereign government of their 
own, and by a sovereign government we mean a government, however constituted, 
which exercises the power of making and enforcing law within a community, and 
is not itself subject to any superior government.”34 And semi-sovereign States 
were termed as “States which are thus dependent on other States, in respect to the 
exercise of certain rights, essential to the perfect external sovereignty”. In addition 
to the United States of the Ionian Islands and Cracow, which were prescribed 
as “semi-sovereign States” by treaties, protectorate or dependent States also fell 
under this category.35 Sovereignty may be exercised either internally or externally. 
“internal sovereignty is that which is inherent in the people of any State, or 
vested in its ruler, by its municipal constitution or fundamental laws … External 
sovereignty consists in the independence of one political society, in respect to all 
other political societies. It is by the exercise of this branch of sovereignty that the 
international relations of one political society are maintained, in peace and in war, 
with all other political societies.”36 
Elements of International Law contains a section entitled “Tributary States”.37 
In the eye of international law, the autonomy of a tributary or vassal State depends 
32   Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, translated by William A. P. Martin, 
proofread by He Qinhua, Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press, 
2003, pp. 25~26. (in Chinese)
33　 Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, edited, with notes, by Richard Henry Dana, 
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1866, p. 22.
34    Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, translated by William A. P. Martin, 
proofread by He Qinhua, Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press, 
2003, p. 37. (in Chinese) 
35　 Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, edited, with notes, by Richard Henry Dana, 
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1866, pp. 45~46.
36　 Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, translated by William A. P. Martin, 
proofread by He Qinhua, Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press, 
2003, pp. 35~36. (in Chinese) 
37　 Section 37, Chapter 2 of Wheaton’s Elements of International Law is entitled “Tributary 
States”, see Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, edited, with notes, by Richard 
Henry Dana, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1866, pp. 48~49. 
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on the sovereignty it enjoyed.38 That is to say, tributary States are still considered 
as sovereign, as far as their sovereignty is not affected by the tribute. Wheaton 
illustrated some categories of tributaries:39 First, the tribute, formerly paid by the 
principal maritime powers of Europe to Barbary, did not at all affect the sovereignty 
and independence of the former; Second, “the King of Naples had been a nominal 
vassal of the Papal See, ever since the eleventh century, but this feudal dependence, 
abolished in 1818, was never considered as impairing the sovereignty of the 
Kingdom of Naples.”40
C. Diplomacy Based on International Law that Qing Court Used to
    Defend Its Vassal States – Korea, Burma and Vietnam
The tributary system, as an important constituent of the political structure of 
ancient China, traces its roots to the Han Dynasty. The Tang Dynasty continued this 
system while making some innovations, by establishing Jimo Prefectures, another 
kind of vassal, in its border areas inhabited by minority nationalities. Following 
the tributary system of the Tang and Yuan Dynasties, the Ming Dynasty also 
devised some new measures to improve the system. And the system flourished in 
the Qing Dynasty.41 The economic exchanges between the suzerain and tributary 
States were primarily conducted through tributes paying, gifting, and tributary 
38   Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, translated by William A. P. Martin, 
proofread by He Qinhua, Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press, 
2003, p. 41. (in Chinese)
39   Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, translated by William A. P. Martin, 
proofread by He Qinhua, Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press, 
2003, pp. 41~42. (in Chinese)
40　 Wheaton, Elements of International Law, edited, with notes, by Richard Henry Dana, 
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1866, p. 49.
41　 Huang Songyun, Theoretic Problems in the Study of Chinese Tributary System, Social 
Science Front, No. 6, 2004, p. 121. (in Chinese) 
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trades. The tributary system is termed by John King Fairbank42 as a graded and 
concentric hierarchy of foreign relations with peoples and States grouped in three 
main zones: firstly, the Sinic Zone, consisting of the most nearby and culturally 
similar territories, including Korea, Vietnam, Ryukyu Islands and, at brief times, 
Japan; secondly, the Inner Asia Zone, consisting of tributary tribes and States of the 
nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples of Inner Asia; thirdly, the Outer Zone, consisting 
of the “Outer barbarians”, generally at a farther distance over land or sea, including 
Japan, some Southeast and South Asian States and Europe.43 The Qing Court 
roughly classified foreign States into two groups: one is “tributaries” (see Table 2), 
which are States having formal diplomatic relations with China, including Korea, 
Ryukyu, Annam (today’s Vietnam), Siam (today’s Thailand), Burma, Laos and 
Sulu (Sulu Archipelago in today’s Philippines); the other group is States that traded 
with China but had no formal diplomatic relations, including Portugal, Spain, the 
Netherlands, the UK, France and other European States.44  
Table 2     Timetable for Chinese Main Tributaries in the Qing Dynasty 
to First Pay Tributes and Receive Investiture45
Name of State
Time for the First Payment of 
Tribute
Investiture Time
Korea 1637 1637
Ryukyu 1651 1654
Annam 1660 1666
42    John King Fairbank has done some pioneering researches on the Sino-centrist worldview, 
which is the theoretic basis of Chinese tributary system, as well as on the characteristics of 
the tributary system which merge politics, trade and diplomacy into its network. Plus, he 
also studied the trend of modern China with his impact-response model. Many concepts 
advanced by scholars afterwards, such as “Huayi Order”, “Chinese Confucian system”, 
“Chinese world order” and “East Asian world order”, are considered as related to ancient 
China’s foreign relations, diplomatic institutions and thoughts, which, however, are all 
associated with Chinese tributary system. Fairbank’s views above described the structure 
of the tributary system. Yet, it should be noted, inner Asian Nomads were greatly different 
from the tributary States within the Chinese culture circle, albeit in the same tributary 
system. Siam, Burma and other tributaries also varied from European States, which cannot 
be put under the same category, because the former States maintained an official tributary 
relations with China. See Wang Peipei, Tributary and Treaty Systems, Social Sciences 
Review, Vol. 26, No. 8, 2011, pp. 115~117. (in Chinese)
43　 John King Fairbank ed., The Chinese World Order, Traditional China’s Foreign Relations, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, p. 2. 
44　 Li Yunquan, The History of Tributary System: A Study on Institutions Related to the Foreign 
Relations of Ancient China, Beijing: Xinhua Press, 2004, pp. 134~148. (in Chinese)
45　 Li Yunquan, The History of Tributary System: A Study on Institutions Related to the Foreign 
Relations of Ancient China, Beijing: Xinhua Press, 2004, p. 137. (in Chinese)
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Siam 1664 1673
Sulu 1726
Loas 1730 1795
Burma 1750 1790
Diplomatic affairs that the Qing Government had to handle with its tributary 
States, are not limited to the status of the latter; they are also closely related to 
complex issues like international treaties, rules of engagement, law of neutrality, 
customary international law and territorial boundaries of States, which this paper 
is not able to exhaust. Nevertheless, the status of tributary States is an issue that 
the Qing Government has to deal with in its diplomatic negotiations. When it 
comes to the issues like whether Korea, Vietnam, Burma and other tributaries 
were autonomous on their own, and how to protect or support them, Qing’s actual 
approaches to these issues deviated a bit from its diplomatic policy.
Among the tributaries of China, Korea was called a “junior Middle-Kingdom”. 
In order to maintain their suzerain-vassal relation, Qing provided omnibearing 
protection to Korea. It not only send troops to Korea, but also directly interfered 
with its internal and foreign affairs at the cost of changing the traditional approach, 
and reinforced its suzerainty over Korea by applying international law and the 
treaty system. Even after the signing of the Convention of Tientsin, also known 
as the Tianjin Convention, in 1885, Qing did not recognize Korea as a sovereign 
State. In the aftermath of Ganghwa Island Incident started by the Japanese in 
1876, following the traditions of “balance-of-power” diplomacy, Qing encouraged 
Korea to open fire with Europe and America, struggling to maintain its suzerainty 
over Korea by building a balance of power there. Being aware that the tenets 
underpinning traditional Chinese world order was unable to maintain Sino-Korean 
relationship any more, Qing changed its diplomatic strategies, even attempting 
to continue their suzerainty-vassal relationship through the application of rules 
of international law. After the Imo Incident in 1882, Qing recognized Korea’s 
autonomy in form, but in substance, Qing started to interfered with its internal and 
foreign affairs; additionally, Qing concluded the Sino-Korean Commercial Treaty 
with Korea in October 1882, proclaiming its traditional suzerainty over Korea in 
writing under the treaty system.46 
46　Lin Xuezhong, From Elements of International Law to Diplomacy Based on International 
Law: the Reception, Interpretation, and Application of International Law in the Late Qing, 
Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing House, 2009, pp. 276~278. (in Chinese)
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Adhering to the border security idea of “protecting China’s tributaries to 
consolidate its own borders”,47 Qing dispatched troops to aid Vietnam, trying to 
keep its enemy from the gates, but with no intention to have any direct conflict with 
France initially. France annexed Vietnam mainly through diplomatic negotiations 
and conclusion of treaties, during which it also destroyed many evidences suppor-
ting China’s suzerainty over Vietnam. First, France asserted, in accordance with the 
tributary system in Western international law, “if a State is superior to another, then 
the former should decide and manage all the government and administrative affairs 
for and on behalf the latter”, therefore China had no effective jurisdiction over 
Vietnam.48 Subsequently, France required China to remain neutral, as a third State, 
in the wars against Vietnam.49 Second, it used a series of treaties, including Tientsin 
Accord, concluded on 11 May 1884 between France and China, and the Treaty of 
Huế, concluded on 6 June 1884 between France and Annam (Vietnam), to gradually 
effect the change of Vietnam from a “sovereign State” to a French protectorate. 
Particularly, before the execution and exchange of text of the Treaty of Huế, Jules 
Patenôtre, the French minister to China, coerced the Nguyen Dynasty to turn in 
the gold plated seal presented by the Qing Emperor several decades earlier to the 
Vietnamese king, which was then melted down,50 so as to permanently destroy the 
proof evidencing China’s suzerainty over Vietnam. In this regard, one comment 
says, “resembling those negotiations between China and Japan over the tributary 
status of Korea, the negotiations between China and France over the tributary status 
of Vietnam are doomed to be a fruitless tug-of-war.”51  
47　Ma Dazheng ed., An Outlined History of Chinese Borders/Book Series on the General 
History of China’s Borders, Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou Ancient Books Publishing House, 
2000, p. 398. (in Chinese)
48　 Kuo Ting-yee et al. eds., Archives on Sino-French Negotiations over the Vietnam Issue (II), 
Taipei: Institute of Modern History, “Academia Sinica”, 1962, p. 927. (in Chinese) 
49　 For example, Li Hongzhang, in June 1883, received a letter from France, which said: 
“Currently, France and Vietnam are at war, which, in accordance with international law, 
any third States should not intervene, therefore, we should discuss the matter after a 
ceasefire between France and Vietnam.” Kuo Ting-yee et al. eds., Archives on Sino-French 
Negotiations over the Vietnam Issue (II), Taipei: Institute of Modern History, “Academia 
Sinica”, 1962, p. 910. (in Chinese)
50　 Zhang Denggui et al. eds., Đại Nam Thực Lục, Tokyo: Keio University, 1961-1981, p. 4, 
quoted from Li Yunquan, Sino-French Negotiations over the Vietnam Issue before the Sino-
French War and the Change of Sino-Vietnamese Relations, Social Science Journal, No. 5, 
2010, p. 155. (in Chinese)
51　 Li Yunquan, Sino-French Negotiations over the Vietnam Issue before the Sino-French War 
and the Change of Sino-Vietnamese Relations, Social Science Journal, No. 5, 2010, p. 151. 
(in Chinese)
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Burma’s official relation with China was not established until the mid-
18th century. In response to UK’s question towards the tributary status of 
Burma, Marquis Zeng Jize, China’s minister to Britain, denied UK’s claims and 
demonstrated that Burma was tributary to China based on sound grounds and 
tangible evidences. The British government claimed that the treaty concluded 
between China and Burma in 1770 was an equal treaty between the two; Marquis 
Zeng refuted this claim, pointing out that the treaty was only a declaration of 
surrender to China made by Burma.52 And he had received a telegraph from Zongli 
Yamen (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) of Qing China, informing him of the size, font 
and content of the seal that the Qing Emperor presented to the Burma King.53 The 
UK also proposed that Burma, in the process of their conflicts, failed to raise any 
request for protection from Qing Court. Qing explained it by saying that Burma 
violated its obligations as a tributary,54 but did not, in substance, intervene in British 
occupation of Burma, which indicated that Qing adopted a pragmatist approach to 
deal with its relations with Burma. In the late 18th and early 19th century, Siam, 
Burma’s southern neighbor, grew in power and brought huge threats to Burma. 
Afterwards, the UK invaded into the southern and western Burma. Under this 
context, Burma frequently sent tributes to China exactly in this period. In practice, 
Burma maintained an “ambiguous attitude”55 towards its tributary status; it neither 
treated China as a “Middle Kingdom”, nor proactively acknowledged its tributary 
relation with China.56 
52    The text of the telegraph reads: “The Seal of Burma King was presented in 1790. The wri-
ting style of the characters on the seal was Shangfang Dazhuan (one type of greater seal 
scripts in ancient China) in the languages of Han and Manchu. The seal is made of silver 
and has a camel-shaped golden handle. The base of the seal is 3.5 * 3.5 Chinese cun (1 cun 
= 31⁄3 cm) and 1 Chinese cun thick. And the words on the seal reads ‘Seal of Burma King 
in Mandalay’.” See He Xinhua, An Analysis on the Tributary Status of Burma in Qing 
Dynasty, Historical Archives, No. 1, 2006, p. 75. (in Chinese)
53　  Wang Yanwei, Historical Documents on Qing’s Foreign Relations (Vol. 61), Beijing: The 
Palace Museum, 1932, p. 29. (in Chinese)
54　 He Xinhua, An Analysis on the Tributary Status of Burma in Qing Dynasty, Historical 
Archives, No. 1, 2006, p. 75. (in Chinese)
55　 Burma’ ambiguous attitude can be detected from Burma King’s attitude towards the seal 
presented by Qianlong Emperor in 1790. When “Chinese envoys carried the camel-shaped 
seal signifying Burma’s subordination to China, the Burma King, fearing to be controlled 
by Qing Court, was initially reluctant to accept the seal. However, he was also unwilling to 
reject such a piece of gold weighing 3 peittha (10 lb), eventually he decided to accept it, but 
ordering his court recorder not to recount this matter.” G. E. Harvey, History of Burma (Vol. 
2), translated by Yao Ziliang, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1973, p. 453. (in Chinese)  
56　 He Xinhua, An Analysis on the Tributary Status of Burma in Qing Dynasty, Historical 
Archives, No. 1, 2006, p. 72. (in Chinese)
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In the middle and late 19th century, “British invasion of Burma, French 
invasion of Vietnam and Japanese invasion of Ryukyu, were all started by the 
foreign sides. Caught in troubled times, China struggled to rise from the ashes, but 
beyond its strength.”57 Qing was eventually defeated in the First Sino-Japanese War 
by the end of the 19th century. After the collapse of the tributary system, China was 
forced to abandon its idea of Middle Kingdom, and to accept Western values based 
on the system of the law of nations. 
III. The Historical and International Law Status of 
       Pre-modern Ryukyu Viewed from Sino-Japanese
       Negotiations concerning Ryukyu
In 19th century, Japanese Meiji government incorporated Ryukyu Kingdom 
into its territories with armed forces within about 10 years, which is called the 
“Disposal of Ryukyu” in history by Japanese. With regards to the “Disposal of 
Ryukyu”, against the backdrop where the colonialism pursued by great powers of 
Europe and America in Asia was spreading at that time, China and Japan carried 
out decades-long negotiations. The dispute over Ryukyu was shelved, when the 
formal negotiations between Japan and China over the division of Ryukyu Islands 
and revision of the treaty concerned was completed in 1880. This Sino-Japanese 
dispute is still pending.
A. Sino-Japanese Negotiations over Ryukyu in the Period 
    between 1871 and 1880
The early Sino-Japanese Negotiations over Ryukyu can be tracked back to the 
57　 Lu Fengshi, Veritable Records of Qing Emperor De Zong (Vol. 232, September 1886), 
Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1987. (in Chinese)
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Mudan Incident of 1871,58 which was finally settled with the conclusion of the Sino-
Japanese Peking Treaty in 1874. However, Qing China paid great compensation to 
Japan against the incident,59 while Japan quickened its step in annexing Ryukyu, 
even after forcing China to recognize its invasion of Taiwan as an act to protect its 
citizens. Further, Japan abolished Ryukyu Domain in 1879, which was renamed 
Okinawa Prefecture with governor appointed by Japan.60 Immediately after that, 
Qing Government submitted notes verbales to Japan, strongly protesting against its 
unilateral disposal of Ryukyu. 
Mediated by U.S. ex-president Ulysses S. Grant, Japan and China started 
the negotiations on the divisions of Ryukyu Islands and revisions of the treaty 
concerned, where division of the islands into two or three parts were deliberated.61 
On 21 October 1880, in line with the plan favored by Japan (dividing the islands 
into two parts), China and Japan came to an agreement and temporarily signed the 
Draft Treaty of Ryukyu and the Supplementary Provisions. The Draft Treaty of 
Ryukyu (originally in Chinese) provides, “the Qing Empire and the Imperial Japan 
agreed, except the territory at the north of Okinawa Island is under the jurisdiction 
of Japan, Miyako and Yaeyama Islands are under the jurisdiction of Qing, so as 
to clarify the boundaries of the two States; the two States should administrate 
58　The Mudan Incident of 1871: in the November of 1871, a Miyako Island ship encountered 
a violent storm at sea and was shipwrecked. 66 crewmen landed on November 7, at 
the Mudan Community where Gaoshan people (raw or wild tribes in Taiwan ) lived. 
Unfortunately, an armed conflict erupted between the crewmen and the local aborigines. 
Of the 66 crewmen, 54 were killed, and 12 were rescued by Yang Youwang and other Han 
Chinese and were transferred to Miyako via Fujian. On 25 February 1872, Wen Yu, the 
Fuzhou General and Governor of Fujian and Zhejiang Provinces, reported the incident to 
Beijing. And Dibao, a kind of newspaper distributed in the capital of Qing Empire, also 
covered this incident. See Mi Qingyu, The Ryukyuan Shipwreck Incidence and Japanese 
Invasion of Taiwan (1871-1874), Historical Research, No. 1, 1999, pp. 21~36. (in Chinese)
59　 Mi Qingyu, The Ryukyuan Shipwreck Incidence and Japanese Invasion of Taiwan (1871-
1874), Historical Research, No. 1, 1999, pp. 21~36. (in Chinese)
60　  Ju Deyuan, A Comment on the Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands 
Issued by the Japanese Government 30 Years Ago, The Journal of Studies of China’s 
Resistance War against Japan, No. 4, 2002, pp. 147~166. (in Chinese)
61　 [Japan] Kikoh Nishizato, A Study on the History of Relations between China, Ryukyu and 
Japan in Late Qing Dynasty (I), translated by Hu Liancheng et al., Beijing: Social Sciences 
Academic Press (China), 2010, p. 312. (in Chinese)
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their own territories without mutual intervention forever.”62 Nevertheless, Qing 
refused to formally sign the agreed scheme on the division of Ryukyu Islands at 
the end, which made the Draft Treaty of Ryukyu an abrogated treaty. As to why 
Qing eventually refused to sign the scheme on the division of Ryukyu Islands and 
revision of the treaty concerned, historians have varied views. One view holds that 
it is primarily caused by the easement of the Qing-Russian relations. Since Qing 
and Russia had smooth negotiations concerning the Ili issue, Qing changed its 
attitude midway, towards the division of Ryukyu Islands and revision of the treaty 
concerned.63 Another believes that it is mainly caused by the internal conflicts 
within the Qing Court. Due to the severe disagreements among the Qing officials, 
the government adopted the strategy of delaying the issue, as proposed by Li 
Hongzhang, and decided not to ratify the draft treaty, with an initial aim to protect 
the kingdom of Ryukyu and avoid “losing Chinese interests in its hinterland”.64 
The third argues that it is chiefly affected by the suicide of Lin Shigong (aka Rin 
Seikou), a Ryukyuan aristocrat.65 While Qing officials were discussing about 
whether to sign the treaty on the division of Ryukyu or not, Lin, who fled secretly 
to China before that, committed suicide in Beijing after submitting a petition to 
Qing Court, seeking to stop the Qing Court from signing the treaty. Lin’s suicide 
affected, to some extent, the result of the internal debates over the signing of the 
treaty in Qing Court. 
Eventually, Qing was defeated in the First Sino-Japanese War, and forced to 
62　 Matters Relating to the Treaty concerning the Disposal of Ryukyu, in Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Japan ed., An Chronological Table of Japanese Foreign Policy and Important 
Documents, 1840-1945 (I), Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1965, pp. 81~85 (in Japanese); Ju Deyuan, 
A Comment on the Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands Issued by the 
Japanese Government 30 Years Ago, The Journal of Studies of China’s Resistance War 
against Japan, No. 4, 2002, pp. 147~166. (in Chinese)
63　 Ueda Toshio, Negotiations between Japan and China over the Sovereignty of Ryukyu, 
in Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia ed., The Memoirs of the Institute for Advanced 
Studies on Asia, No. 2, 1951. (in Japanese)
64　 Mi Qingyu, A Research on Ryukyuan History, Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 
1998, p. 226. (in Chinese)
65　 [Japan] Kikoh Nishizato, A Study on the History of Relations between Ryukyu and Japan 
in the Late Qing Dynasty (I), translated by Hu Liancheng et al., Beijing: Social Sciences 
Academic Press (China), 2010, p. 35. (in Chinese)
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sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895,66 which provided that China should cede 
to Japan the Pescadores group, Formosa (Taiwan) and Liaodong Peninsula. At that 
time, Qing was unable to resume its relation with Ryukyu. Nonetheless, up until 
the breakout of the First Sino-Japanese War, both States still considered the status 
of Ryukyu as unsettled. Unsatisfied with Japan’s governance after its annexation of 
Ryukyu, many Ryukyuans fled to Qing China, seeking to restore the kingdom. 
    
B. The Status of Pre-modern Ryukyu in International Law
Japanese historian Kikoh Nishizato observed that, when debating the issue 
of the sovereignty over Ryukyu, both China and Japan had, in different stages 
of diplomatic negotiations, frequently or voluminously invoked the Elements 
of International Law; moreover, during the period between 1875 and 1879, the 
Ryukyuan envoys, who were sent to Tokyo to give a full account of Ryukyu’s 
situation, also invoked the Elements of International Law, in a petition effort, to 
protest against Japan’s exclusive claims over Ryukyu.67 Viewed from intertemporal 
law,68 the international law status of Ryukyu in the second half of the 19th century 
can only be determined impartially, by applying the international law at that time, 
i.e., Elements of International Law, and considering the political pattern of Asia 
in the context of colonial invasion. Obviously, theories of modern international 
66　 The Treaty of Shimonoseki (Japanese: 下 関 条 約 , “Shimonoseki Jōyaku”) was a treaty 
signed in Shimonoseki, Japan on April 17, 1895, between the Empire of Japan and the 
Qing Empire, ending the First Sino-Japanese War. It was signed by Li Hongzhang and Li 
Jingfang on behalf of the Emperor of China and Ito Hirobumi and Mutsu Munemitsu for the 
Emperor of Japan.
67    Ryukyuan envoys sent to Tokyo asserted that the existence of a State subordinated to two 
other States was permitted under the Elements of International Law, since, for example, 
Poland was once subject to three States: Prussia, Austria and Russia. [Japan] Kikoh 
Nishizato, A Study on the History of Relations between Ryukyu and Japan in the Late Qing 
Dynasty (I), translated by Hu Liancheng et al., Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press 
(China), 2010, pp. 29~32. (in Chinese)
68    Intertemporal Law, also known as Transitory Law, deals with the complications caused 
by the conflict of laws in time, which determines the time when a law is applicable. In 
territorial disputes, intertemporal law is a critical legal element to be considered. The origins 
of Intertemporal Law as a legal theoretical concept, are to be found in arbitrator Huber’s 
discussion in the Palmas Arbitration Case before the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 
where he stated “a juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary 
with it, and not of the law in force at the time when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls 
to be settled.” This concept has gradually developed in the practice of territorial disputes 
settlement and treaty laws. See The Island of Palmas Case (or Miangas), United States of 
America v. The Netherlands (1928), Permanent Court of Arbitration, pp. 4~6, p. 37.
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law, especially the theories and practices relating to States, sovereignty and 
territorial disputes, would facilitate a better understanding of the international law 
status of Ryukyu. The historical and legal status of pre-modern Ryukyu should be 
demonstrated in the following aspects.
First, Ryukyu’s secret subordination to Japan in history, does not imply that 
Satsuma’s invasion of Ryukyu, at that time, conformed to the international law 
rules regarding acquisition of territory. On the contrary, the claim that Japan had 
exclusive sovereignty over Ryukyu, which was raised by Japanese representatives 
in Sino-Japanese negotiations over Ryukyu, is ill-founded both in history and in 
international law at that time. As described above, after Satsuma’s invasion of 
Ryukyu in 1609, Ryukyu had undergone a stage called “dual subordination to 
Japan and China”. However, the Ryukyu Kingdom was conquered by the local 
authorities of Satsuma Domain, rather than the Tokugawa Shogunate on behalf 
of the Japanese central government. From 1609 to the end of the Edo period, 
Tokugawa Shogunate did not intend to incorporate Ryukyu into its territory, but 
considered it a separate kingdom, independent from more than 60 provinces under 
its jurisdiction. This fact can be illustrated by the following examples. Example 1: 
in May 1610, Honda Masazumi, the rōjū (one of the highest-ranking government 
posts under the Tokugawa Shogunate) of Tokugawa Shogunate, wrote to Shimazu 
Iehisa of Satsuma Domain, commanding the latter to take the captured Ryukyuan 
King, like a Korean envoy, to Edo;69 Example 2: in September of the same year, 
Tokugawa Hidetada, the second shogun of the Tokugawa dynasty, publicly 
promised the Ryukyuan King, saying, “the Shō family has been the King of 
Ryukyu for generations; they should return to their kingdom as soon as possible, so 
as to enshrine and worship their ancestors, to promote the prestige and good name 
of this dynasty, and hand down the throne to their later generations forever.”70 In 
this connection, the author asserts that being a local authority, Satsuma’s invasion 
of Ryukyu in 1609 had not been authorized, or retroactively recognized, by the 
central government, therefore this invasion fails to meet the requisite in form for 
acquisition of territory. Then take the historical facts into account, does Satsuma’s 
conquest of Ryukyu by violence have the effect of obtaining the territorial 
69   He Ciyi, The History of the Relations between Ryukyu and Japan in Ming and Qing 
Dynasties, Nanjing: Jiangsu Ancient Books Publishing House Co. Ltd., 2002, p. 55. (in 
Chinese)
70　 [Japan] Kuroita Katsumi, Tokugawa Jikki (Chapter 1), in Shintei Zoho, Kokushi Taikei (Vol. 
38), Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1929. (in Japanese)
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sovereignty of Ryukyu? Conquest means a State, without the consent of other 
States, places the territory of other States under its control by force of arms. It is 
a way of territory transfer acknowledged by the ancient international law, but no 
longer a legal means to obtain territorial sovereignty in recent international law.71 
Furthermore, in general international law, the acquisition of territory by conquest 
often has to take two steps: the first is to defeat and dissolve a State (de bellatio); 
the second is to annex the defeated State into the victor’s national territory after its 
dissolution.72 This is greatly different from the act of Japanese central government 
in 1879, when Japanese forces were sent to Ryukyu and Ryukyu was transformed 
into Okinawa Prefecture. After its invasion of Ryukyu, Satsuma was ordered by the 
central government to send the Ryukyuan King back to the kingdom; and Ryukyu 
had maintained its political regimes and rule over the kingdom for a long period. 
Thereafter, in order to seek gains from Sino-Ryukyuan trades, Satsuma did not 
cut off the tributary relation between China and Ryukyu; instead, both Satsuma 
and Ryukyu chose to hide their own relations from the international community, 
including China. It can be argued that Ryukyu had maintained both internal and 
external sovereignty, even in modern international law. Therefore, Ryukyu’s secret 
subordination to Japan, due to the threats from Satsuma, does not imply that Japan 
had obtained the sovereignty over the pre-modern Ryukyu. In later negotiations 
between China and Japan over Ryukyu, the Qing Court asserted that Ryukyu, an 
independent State, accepted China’s investiture for generations, and considered 
China as its suzerainty; “Ryukyu was subordinated both to China and Japan”.73 
However, the claim of Japan’s exclusive sovereignty over Ryukyu, mainly proposed 
by Japanese foreign minister Terashima in his book A Brief Introduction, insisted 
that the issue over Ryukyu was the “internal affairs” of Japan, since it was not an 
71    Su Yi-xiong, International Law in Peacetime, Taipei: San Min Book Co., Ltd., 1993, p. 178. 
(in Chinese) 
72    Suya P. Sharma, Territorial Acquisition, Disputes and International Law, The Hague/Bos-
ton/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, p. 143. 
73　 Mi Qingyu, A Research on Ryukyuan History, Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 
1998, p. 199. (in Chinese)
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independent State, nor “subordinated to both China and Japan”.74 The core issue 
underlining these negotiations was the international status of Ryukyu. Japanese 
claims have big loopholes both in history and international law. After Satsuma’s 
invasion of Ryukyu in 1609, the latter not only retained its political institutions and 
reign title, but also had diplomatic and trade exchanges with its Asian neighbors, 
including the Japanese shogunate. In the mid-19th century, Ryukyu, in the name of 
a State under modern international law, signed commercial treaties with the U.S., 
France and the Netherlands. In a word, historical facts concerning the diplomatic 
relations between China, Japan and Ryukyu reveal that, it is historically true that 
albeit an independent kingdom, the pre-modern Ryukyu, in the period between 
1609 and 1879, was subordinated both to Japan and China; the issue concerning 
the status of Ryukyu at that period does not fall under the category of “Japanese 
internal affairs”, as claimed by the Meiji Government, not to say Japanese 
“sovereignty” over Ryukyu. 
Second, the fact that Ryukyu, as an independent State, was subordinated both 
to China and Japan in history, is consistent with international law. During Sino-
Japanese diplomatic negotiations on the issue of Ryukyu, the Qing Government 
claimed that Ryukyu was “subordinated both to China and Japan”, but at the same 
time, it was also an independent and autonomous State. Japan refuted China’s 
claims, pointing out that “if it is a State, it can not be subordinated to other States; 
likewise, if it is subordinated to other States, then it cannot be an independent 
State.” Japan further invoked the Elements of International Law to prove the 
illogicality of Qing’s claims, and insisted that Ryukyu was a part of Japan.75 In this 
connection, Kikoh Nishizato observed, “deduced from the logic of the traditional 
74　 The claim of Japan’s exclusive sovereignty over Ryukyu was mainly proposed by Japanese 
foreign minister Terashima in his book A Brief Introduction. With regards to this claim, 
the Meiji Government stressed the similarity and connection between Ryukyu and Japan, 
prior to the Satsuma Invasion of Ryukyu in 1609, in terms of geographical relationship and 
location, as well as culture and ethnics, and also mentioned that Ryukyu paid tributes to 
Japan earlier than to China, which was subject to the administration of Daizaifu specially 
set up by Japan. Japan also emphasized, after 1609, Shogunate had already given Ryukyu 
to Satsuma Domain, which exercised political rule over Ryukyu in many aspects, including 
military, tax, and law-making. Mi Qingyu, A Research on Ryukyuan History, Tianjin: 
Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 1998, p. 199. (in Chinese)
75　 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan ed., Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, Vol. 12, 
Tokyo: International Association of Japan, 1973, quoted from [Japan] Kikoh Nishizato, A 
Study on the History of Relations between Ryukyu and Japan in the Late Qing Dynasty (I), 
translated by Hu Liancheng et al., Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2010, 
p. 30. (in Chinese)
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tributary system, a State can be autonomous in terms of internal affairs, and also 
tributary to other States in terms of foreign relations, which are not contradictory 
to each other. However, this logic is not so persuasive to Japan, which did not 
accept the tributary system. In this context, the debate between the two States 
stalled.”76 Does Qing’s argument that Ryukyu, being an independent State, was 
subordinated to both China and Japan, square with international law? The answer 
lies in the theories, as contained in the Elements of International Law, relating to 
the constitution of a State.77 Elements of International Law divided “international 
persons”, a concept in modern international law, into several categories, including 
sovereign State, semi-sovereign State, protectorate and tributary. Different from 
sovereign and semi-sovereign States, the autonomy of a tributary or vassal State 
depends on the sovereignty it enjoyed.78 That is to say, tributary States are still 
considered as sovereign, as far as their sovereignty is not affected by the tribute. 
After Satsuma’s invasion of Ryukyu in 1609, Ryukyu entered into a stage called 
“dual subordination”, to China nominally and to Japan technically and secretly. 
This stage continued up until the early years of the Japanese Meiji Restoration. As a 
tributary State, Ryukyu had the autonomy to handle its internal affairs, which were 
not interfered by its suzerain – China; China only dispatched envoys to perform 
symbolic investiture ceremonies for new kings of Ryukyu.79 China, being a suzerain 
76　 [Japan] Kikoh Nishizato, A Study on the History of Relations between Ryukyu and Japan 
in the Late Qing Dynasty (I), translated by Hu Liancheng et al., Beijing: Social Sciences 
Academic Press (China), 2010, p. 30. (in Chinese)
77    Existing literature has attempted, by invoking the relations between the principal maritime 
powers of Europe and Barbary States, to draw an analogy between the status of Ryukyu and 
these powers of Europe. See Wang Xin, Historical Changes of the Legal Status of Ryukyu 
under International Law, Graduate Law Review. CUPL, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 112~120 
(in Chinese); Wang Xin, An Exploration of the Diaoyu Islands Disputes Seen from the 
Historical Changes of the Legal Status of Ryukyu (master thesis), Beijing: China University 
of Political Science and Law, 2010, p. 8 (in Chinese); Zhang Yi, The Study on Legal Status 
of the Ryukyu Islands on International Law (doctoral thesis), Beijing: China University of 
Political Science and Law, 2013, pp. 63~64. (in Chinese) Such practice has appeared in 
history: in order to protest against the Meiji Government’s claim of exclusive sovereignty 
over Ryukyu, Ryukyuan envoys sent to Tokyo asserted that the existence of a State 
subordinated to two other States was permitted under the Elements of International Law, 
since, for example, Poland was once subject to three States: Prussia, Austria and Russia. 
[Japan] Kikoh Nishizato ed., Petitions for Salvation of Ryukyu Kingdom, Tokyo: Hosei 
University Institute for Okinawan Studies, 1992. (in Japanese)
78　 Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, translated by William A. P. Martin, 
proofread by He Qinhua, Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press, 
2003, p. 41. (in Chinese)
79　 Xiu Bin and Jiang Bingguo, The Subjugation of Ryukyu and Losing the Function of the 
Investiture-Tributary System in East Asia, Japanese Studies, No. 6, 2007. (in Chinese)
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State, did not attempt to seek interests from tributary trades, but offer financial aid 
to its tributaries by gifting. China strove to maintain its influence on its tributaries, 
mainly through its own strong political, economic and cultural appeal and vitality, 
rather than military conquest and annexation. During this period, Ryukyu relied on 
its original political structure to deal with internal affairs, and in terms of foreign 
relations, it concluded bilateral treaties with France, the U.S., and the Netherlands 
as a State. Although the internal affairs of Ryukyu were subject to Satsuma, and 
Ryukyuan customs were gradually integrated into Japanese culture, Japanese 
residing in Ryukyu would leave in advance, when they were aware of the arrival of 
Qing envoys. This paper holds, based on the historical facts and the international 
law at that time, Ryukyu was dually subordinated to China and Japan, but still 
independent and autonomous at the same time, which are not contradictory to each 
other. Certainly, it is undeniable, when Ryukyu was annexed and incorporated 
into Japanese territory in 1879, it became a colony of Japan, which impaired the 
sovereignty of Ryukyu. 
Third, Ryukyu and the great powers of Europe and America all considered 
the kingdom as an independent State. Shō Tai, the last king of Ryukyu, believed 
that the kingdom “belonged to Japan and China … the two are the parent countries 
of Ryukyu.”80 In 1867, Michihira Iwashita attended the opening ceremony of 
the Paris Exposition, presenting himself as the envoy representing the Ryukyuan 
king. In protest, Japanese Tokugawa Shogunate, declared to the Exposition that 
“Ryukyu was conquered by the Satsuma Domain as commanded by the Tokugawa 
Shogunate, therefore, it became a vassal State of Satsuma, rather than a State 
independent from Japan.” However, this protest had not been accepted.81 During 
the period from 1875 to 1879, the Ryukyuan envoys, who were sent to give a full 
account of Ryukyu’s situation, initiated petition efforts in Tokyo and nearby areas. 
In these efforts, Ryukyuan envoys reiterated the need to “act in good faith”, and 
expressed their reluctance to renounce the political independence of the kingdom, 
and the unwillingness to cut off its relations with China.82 In 1879, Shō Tukukō, a 
80    [Japan] Chōken Kishaba, Ryūkyū kenbunroku (Vols. 1~2), Tokyo: Perikansha Publishing 
Inc., 1977 (in Japanese), quoted from [Japan] Kikoh Nishizato, A Study on the History 
of Relations between Ryukyu and Japan in the Late Qing Dynasty (I), translated by Hu 
Liancheng et al., Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2010, p. 31. (in Chinese)
81　 Ming Juinn Li, The Sovereignty of the Ryukyu Islands from the Perspective of International 
Law, Taiwan International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2005, p. 56. (in Chinese) 
82    [Japan] Kikoh Nishizato ed., Petitions for Salvation of Ryukyu Kingdom, Tokyo: Hosei 
University Institute for Okinawan Studies, 1992.
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Ryukyuan aristocrat and government official who fled to China to seek help from 
Qing Court, refuted the views expressed by Japanese foreign minister Terashima 
in his book A Brief Introduction.83 In terms of the attitudes of the international 
community, the major powers of Europe and America, in the period between 1840 
and 1879, not only had the knowledge of Ryukyu’s dual subordination, but also 
mediated between China and Japan by adopting the pragmatic diplomatic policy, 
seeking to open the country to trade. For example, U.S. ex-president Grant had 
mediated between China and Japan concerning the issue of Ryukyu. In 1879, 
when discussing the Ryukyu issue with Li Hongzhang, Grant said: “Ryukyu is an 
independent State, but Japan intends to expand its own territory by annexing it. 
China is fighting for land, rather than tribute, which is reasonable. In this regard, it 
is better for China and Japan to sign a separate treaty in the future.”84 Afterwards, 
Grant actively coordinated the diplomatic negotiations between Japan and China 
over the division of Ryukyu Islands and revision of the treaty concerned. Further, 
Ryukyu concluded bilateral treaties (see Table 3) with France, the U.S., and the 
Netherlands as a State. The capability to carry out exchange activities and conclude 
treaties with foreign States, in the eye of international law at that time, is an 
important index to determine the status of a State. Therefore, the sovereignty of 
Ryukyu was widely acknowledged by the then international community. 
83    Shō Tukukō argued, “Japan claims that the government system and political structure of 
Ryukyu was established by Japan, and Ryukyu is not a sovereign and independent State. 
However, to determine a State’s government system and political structure, the following 
rituals or factors are critical: investiture rituals, granting title of a reigning dynasty, giving 
a royal name, following the calendar, laws and decrees, and rites of a certain dynasty. 
Ryukyu has paid tribute to China since 1372, when King Satto was conferred as king 
of Chūzan by China, and the country’s name was changed from “ 琉 求 ” to “ 琉 球 ” in 
Chinese. During the reign of Yongle Emporor, Ryukyu King was given the surname of Shō. 
Ryukyu follows the calendar, rites and rituals, as well as laws and statutes of China, which 
has never changed up till now. The post and rank of Ryukyuan officials, the recruitment 
and resignation of its staff, the issuing and abolishment of imperial orders or decrees, and 
the clothing system, are all decided by the King and councilors of Ryukyu, without being 
intervened by Japan. In the treaties signed by Ryukyu with France, the United States, and 
the Netherlands respectively, Ryukyu signed the date following Chinese calendar and the 
names of its own officials. Ryukyu is a sovereign State, which is known to all States. That 
Ryukyu is not subject to Japan is a self-evident fact, which does not need to be proved 
through debate.” See Wang Yunsheng, China and Japan in the Last Six Decades, Vol. 1, 
Tianjin: Ta Kung Pao, 1932, pp. 127~129. (in Chinese)
84　 [Japan] Kikoh Nishizato, A Study on the History of Relations between Ryukyu and Japan 
in the Late Qing Dynasty (I), translated by Hu Liancheng et al., Beijing: Social Sciences 
Academic Press (China), 2010, p. 307. (in Chinese)
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Fourth, when facing foreign invasion or colonial rule, other tributary States 
having the same status with Ryukyu under Chinese tributary system, such as 
Vietnam, Korea and Burma, had settled the issue concerning their status through 
the conclusion of treaties, and eventually won their independence in the 20th 
century. In Chinese tributary system, Ryukyu, Vietnam, Korea and Burma fell 
under the same category of tributary or vassal States, among which Ryukyu was 
the most submissive one. However, when Ryukyu domain was abolished and 
transformed into a prefecture by Japan in 1879, Ryukyu became a Japanese colony. 
In contrast with Ryukyu, Vietnam, Korea and Burma renounced their traditional 
links with China in accordance with the relevant treaties. Specifically, in the wake 
of the Sino-French War (1885), France forced China to sign the Treaty of Tientsin, 
supplanting China’s suzerainty over Vietnam, and placing Vietnam under French 
protection. The Convention Relating to Burma signed between China and Britain 
in 1886, agreed that China would recognize Britain’s rights in Burma while Britain 
continued the Burmese payment of tribute every ten years to China, by which 
Britain gradually turned Burma into its colony. After the First Sino-Japanese War 
in 1894, China was forced to agree to renounce its suzerainty over Korea in the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki. These facts show, in the late Qing, the change of status of 
China’s neighboring tributaries was provided by treaties, and also recognized by 
their suzerain State – China. Nevertheless, from Japanese annexation of Ryukyu 
in 1879 to the end of World War II, China and Japan, with respect to the change 
of the sovereignty of Ryukyu and the arrangement of Ryukyuan territory, failed to 
conclude any formal agreements, except the negotiations over the draft treaty on 
the division of Ryukyu. In the 20th century, those tributaries (other than Ryukyu) 
under Chinese tributary system, after suffering many mishaps, freed themselves 
from colonial rule, and became independent States in the UN framework. 
In the middle and late 19th century, Sino-Japanese negotiations over 
Ryukyu were carried out against the backdrop, where the tributary system came 
into conflicts with the system of the law of nations. It is proved that, hugely 
impacted by the invasion of great powers and the international situation at large, 
Qing China, with declining national and military strength, only hoped to invoke 
international law to “convince its opponents with just grounds and settle disputes 
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appropriately”.86 However, it merely knew how to use Western international law 
as an instrument or tool, but had little knowledge on how to use it flexibly and 
skillfully, as such, Qing learned many painful lessons for that. Tang Caichang, a 
well-known activist in the Constitutional Reform Movement in late Qing Dynasty, 
pointed out the reasons for China’s failure in foreign negotiations, saying that “the 
failure was caused by China’s declining strengths, also by its failure to invoke 
international law, as well as the lack of talents familiar with international law to 
fight for China’s rights and interests based on reasonable grounds.”87 The result of 
Sino-Japanese negotiations over Ryukyu proved this point exactly. 
IV. The Legal Status of Ryukyu and the Disputes over 
      the Sovereignty of Diaoyu Islands
The claims to sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands made by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan are closely related to the issue of Ryukyu. In order to 
demonstrate that Japan’s incorporation of Diaoyu Islands into its territory was 
an act of “occupation” under international law, Japan argued that “the Senkaku 
Islands have historically and consistently been part of the Nansei Shoto Islands 
which have been part of the territory of Japan”, using the surveys of the Diaoyu 
Islands conducted by the agencies of Okinawa Prefecture in the late 19th century 
86   On 12 April 1877, Shō Tukukō, the Grand Master with the Purple-Golden Ribbon (a 
government official of Ryukyu), sailed to Fujian Province to seek assistance from Qing 
Court. When meeting He Jing, the Viceroy of Minzhe, and Fujian Provincial Governor 
Ding Richang, Shō submitted the petitions written by the Ryukyu King to them, requesting 
Qing Government to help Ryukyu settle its problems. He Ruzhang, a Chinese envoy sent to 
Japan, warned and suggested, “Japan incessantly prevented Ryukyu from paying tribute to 
China, it would surely annex Ryukyu. When Ryukyu is annexed, Korea would be in peril.” 
However, Li Hongzhang asserted, “among the best, the second best and the worst plans 
(presented by He Ruzhang), the best plan is to dispatch forces to call Japan to account, 
and the second best is to reach an agreement with Ryukyuans to require them to resist the 
Japanese and China would assist them, when necessary. These two plans seem to make a 
great fuss about nothing, which might cause panic. However, if we repetitively debate with 
Japan, Japan would become aware that it is in the wrong, then it might not dare to transform 
the Ryukyu domain into a prefecture. In that way, Ryukyuans would retain their land, and 
the invaders would withdraw without violence being used. The last plan seems to be the 
worst, however, it is actually the one we have to choose today.” See Complete Works of Li 
Hongzhang – Letters to the Imperial Prince in Charge of Zongli Yamen, Vol. 8, p. 1. 
87    Tang Caichang, Rules about the Establishment of a School of Chinese and Western Law, 
in Hunan Provincial Institute of Philosophy and Social Science ed., Collection of Tang 
Caichang’s Works, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1980, p. 27. (in Chinese)
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as “historical evidences”.88 These claims, apparently, have been raised by Japanese 
authorities after considering historical facts, international law theories associated 
with territorial disputes and law of treaties. In addition, China’s “initial discovery” 
of the Diaoyu Islands, and China being the “initial holder of the sovereignty” over 
the Diaoyu Islands, were denied by the Japanese academia, which, instead, made 
some claims to these islands favorable to Japan.89 This paper holds, an examination 
of the geographical scope of Ryukyu Kingdom and the delimitation of Sino-
Ryukyuan boundary, would provide significant insights into a further discussion 
over the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands from the perspectives of history and 
geography. Chinese, Japanese and Ryukyuan historical accounts, concerning the 
period between 1429 and 1879, are important historical evidences supporting 
China’s sovereignty claims to the Diaoyu Islands. Overall, the Diaoyu Islands has 
constituted an inherent part of China, rather than Ryukyu, ever since ancient times, 
which can be substantiated by historical accounts from China, Japan and Ryukyu, 
and also by social, cultural, geographical and hydrological evidences. 
A. Social, Cultural, Geographical and Hydrological Factors Supporting 
    China’s, rather than Ryukyu’s, First Discovery of the Diaoyu Islands 
The Diaoyu Islands, since the early Ming Dynasty, has always been a part 
of Chinese territory, which was employed as sea marks to aid navigation. These 
88　Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Senkaku Islands Q&A, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/
region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html, 12 October 2016; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan, The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, at http://www.mofa.
go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/basic_view.html, 12 October 2016.
89     In all the researches on the Diaoyu Islands from the perspective of international law, the 
most representative works or papers by Japanese scholars include: Keishiro Iriye, The Basis 
for the Development of the Oceans Surrounding Senkaku Islands, Kikan Okinawa [Okinawa 
Quarterly], March 1971, p. 56 (in Japanese); Keishiro Iriye, Sino-Japanese Peace Talk and 
the Status of Senkaku Islands, Kikan Okinawa [Okinawa Quarterly], December 1972, p. 63 
(in Japanese); Okuhara Toshio, The Sovereignty Issue of Senkaku Islands, Kikan Okinawa 
[Okinawa Quarterly], March 1971, p. 56 (in Japanese); Ozaki Shigeyoshi, Territorial 
Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, Reference, No. 263, 1972 (in Japanese); Midorima 
Sakae, The Senkaku Islands, Naha: Hirugisha, 1984 (in Japanese); Unryu Suganuma, 
Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations-Irredentism and the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000; Ozaki Shigeyoshi, 
Territorial Issues on the East China Sea: A Japanese Position, Journal of East Asia and 
International Law, No. 3, 2010; Ozaki Shigeyoshi, Senkaku Islands and Japan’s Territorial 
Rights, Diplomacy, No. 12, 2012 (in Japanese); Ishii Nozomu, The Available Historical Data 
and Materials about the Prehistory of Senkaku and Terra Nullius (Land without Owner), 
Yaeyama Nippo, 3 August 2013. (in Japanese) 
The Historical and Legal Status of Pre-modern Ryukyu and 
the Sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands 141
islands have never been a part of Ryukyu, basically because the Ryukyuans failed 
to discover them before the Chinese.90 Chinese first discovery of the Diaoyu Islands 
was greatly facilitated by its suitable social and cultural, as well as geographical 
and hydrological conditions. 
First, Ryukyu was inferior to China, with respect to iron producing and 
shipbuilding technology, as well as sailing skills. Since ancient times, Ryukyu 
lacked the iron sand needed in the production of wrought iron, therefore even 
ironware of every uses was not available in its market.91 At some time in history, 
Ryukyu “had no commercial, industrial or mineral industry, nor traders or 
merchants”, and its people “used bamboo to make rafts, instead of taking ships 
or boats”.92 In the 14-15th century, the Ryukyuan shipping industry was still at 
a primary stage. Considering the poorly-developed shipbuilding and shipping 
technology of Ryukyu, Zhu Yuanzhang, the first emperor of Chinese Ming Dynasty, 
presented, in 1392, Ryukyu with sea-going ships, and also sent “Fujian citizens 
bearing 36 different surnames, who are good at shipping, to Ryukyu, and ordered 
them to carry out tributary missions.”93 These factors decide the impossibility for 
the Ryukyuans to first discover the Diaoyu Islands. In contrast, the Chinese, at 
that time, had good shipbuilding and shipping skills, and invented the compass, 
a necessary tool used in navigation, it is therefore justified to say that China first 
discovered the Diaoyu Islands. 
Second, judging from the distance to the compass route and the number 
of islands serving as navigational aids, ancient Chinese had better chance to 
first discover the Diaoyu Islands. According to Chinese historical records about 
compass routes and the distance concerned, the distance between Minjiang River 
estuary and the Diaoyu Islands was 330 km approximately; on west of Keelung, 
there were islands used for navigational aids, such as White Dog Islands, and 
90   Sha Xuejun, Historical and Geographical Evidences Supporting China’s, Rather Than 
Ryukyu’s Ownership of Diaoyutai, Journal of Xuecui, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1972, p. 16. (in 
Chinese)
91   Sha Xuejun, Historical and Geographical Evidences Supporting China’s, Rather Than 
Ryukyu’s Ownership of Diaoyutai, Journal of Xuecui, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1972, p. 16. (in 
Chinese)
92    Li Tingji, Li Wen Jie Gong Wen Ji (Collected Works of H.E. Mr. Li), in Chen Zilong et al. 
eds., Ming Jing Shi Wen Bian (The Collection of the Articles on the Management of State 
Affairs in the Ming Dynasty), Vol. 460, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1962. (in 
Chinese)
93    Long Wenbin, Ming Hui Yao (Records of Ming Dynasty), Vol. 77, Foreign State 1, Ryukyu, 
Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1956. (in Chinese) 
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Dongshashan (island), hence it was quite convenient for the Chinese to reach the 
Diaoyu Islands. Plus, Keelung was only 200 km away from the Diaoyu Islands, 
and HoapinSu and Pengjia Islet were used as sea marks between them. In contrast, 
the distance between Naha of Ryukyu and the Diaoyu Islands, and that between 
Kume-jima and the Diaoyu Islands were 460 km and 410 km respectively, both of 
which were one times longer than that from Keelung to the Diaoyu Islands. More 
importantly, a small island called Chiwei, also used as a navigation mark, was 
lying between Kume-jima and the Diaoyu Islands. To cross the distance of 280 
km on the sea between Chiwei Island and Kume-jima, seemed to be an impossible 
challenge to Ryukyuans, since their navigation and shipbuilding technology was 
poorly developed. Even though Chiwei Island was only 130 km away from the 
Diaoyu Islands, it was still difficult for the Ryukyuans to reach there by sea, due to 
the long distance from the Diaoyu Islands to Naha and Kume-jima and the resulting 
inconvenience of contact and communication.94 
Third, based on the flow direction of the Black Tide, the hydrological condi-
tions of the waters surrounding Diaoyu Islands, and the routes of the investiture 
missions, we can see that the Chinese were more inclined than the Ryukyuans to 
discover the Diaoyu Islands, and Japanese claim of these islands being terra nullius 
is groundless. From time immemorial, the Chinese, relying on the monsoon and 
Black Tide (also called “Japan Current”),95 had travelled to Ryukyu and Japan. In 
ancient times, Chinese ships usually sailed from Minjiang River to Ryukyu, via 
northern Taiwan. The Chinese ships were sailing downward with the branch of the 
Black Tide and the southeast monsoon, implying that these ships could travel faster 
and had greater chances to discover the Diaoyu Islands. In contrast, to reach the 
Diaoyu Islands, Ryukyuan ships had to first go through the Ryukyu Trench, and sail 
against the Black Tide, which would drag down the sailing speed and further add 
to the difficulties of sailing. Therefore, the Ryukyuans had lesser chances to first 
94   Sha Xuejun, Historical and Geographical Evidences Supporting China’s, Rather than 
Ryukyu’s Ownership of Diaoyutai, Journal of Xuecui, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1972, p. 17. (in 
Chinese)
95    “Black Tide” is a north-flowing branch of the Pacific North Equatorial Current when it 
flows along the coast of mainland. It begins off the Philippines, Taiwan Strait, the east 
coast of Taiwan and flows northeastward past Yaeyama, Miyako and Diaoyu Islands, and 
then towards Japan and South Korea. It flows at a speed of 4-5 nautical miles per hour on 
average. When it pasts Yaeyama, Miyako, Ryukyu Islands and Diaoyu Islands, its western 
part returns south, owing to the wind direction and impact of coast. See Yang Chungkui, 
China, Ryukyu and Diaoyu Islands, Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1972, p. 135. (in 
Chinese) 
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discover the Diaoyu Islands.96
Fourth, the relevant submarine topography information tells that a natural 
boundary exists between China and Ryukyu. From Tsushima Strait, to South of 
the Diaoyu Island and the Chiwei Island, the northern coast of Taiwan, the entire 
Taiwan Strait, and then to the coast of Guangdong Province, there are continental 
shelves within 200 meters, which are the natural prolongation of China’s land 
territory. In comparison, the waters near the Southeastern Ryukyu Islands is, on 
average, more than 3,000 meters deep, with a maximum depth of 7,000 meters 
above. Plus, the trench located between the Ryukyu Islands and the Diaoyu Islands 
is called the Ryukyu Trench. Most part of the trench is 1000~2000 meters deep. 
The trench trends north-northeast to south-south west, with its southern part lying 
between the Yaeyama Islands and Taiwan. The Black Tide, which moves from 
south to north in the Ryukyu Trench, together with the trench, forms the natural 
boundary between China and the Ryukyu Kingdom.97 From time immemorial, the 
Ryukyuans have lived on the eastern side of this boundary, and the Chinese on the 
western side. To conclude, due to the social, cultural, geographical, geological and 
hydrological factors above, the Ryukyuan did not have the chance to discover the 
Diaoyu Islands earlier than the Chinese. 
B. The Existence of a Natural Boundary Between China and 
    Ryukyu: Evidences from Historical Accounts of Many States
 
The fact that a boundary exists between China and Ryukyu, and that the 
Diaoyu Islands is a part of Chinese territory, is a common understanding reached 
between the two States. During almost five centuries, spanning from 1372 to 1866, 
the imperial courts of the Ming and Qing Dynasties sent imperial envoys to Ryukyu 
24 times to perform investiture ceremonies and rituals for Ryukyuan kings, and 
the Diaoyu Islands was exactly located on their route to Ryukyu. Ample volume of 
records about the Diaoyu Islands could be found in the mission reports written by 
Chinese imperial envoys, including Chen Kan, Xie Jie, Xia Ziyang, Wang Ji and 
96   Sha Xuejun, Historical and Geographical Evidences Supporting China’s, Rather Than 
Ryukyu’s Ownership of Diaoyutai, Journal of Xuecui, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1972, p. 17. (in 
Chinese)
97   Sha Xuejun, Historical and Geographical Evidences Supporting China’s, Rather Than 
Ryukyu’s Ownership of Diaoyutai, Journal of Xuecui, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1972, p. 17. (in 
Chinese)
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Zhou Huang. In 1650, Shō Shōken, the Ryukyuan sessei (“prime minister”) at that 
time, compiled the first history of the Ryukyu Kingdom, chūzan seikan (Mirror of 
Chūzan). This book quoted the full passage concerning the Diaoyu Islands from the 
Record of the Imperial Envoy’s Visit to Ryukyu, a book written by Chinese envoy 
Chen Kan. Notably, Shō Shōken raised no objection to the sentence “Then Gumi 
Mountain (known as Kume Island today) comes into sight, that is where the land 
of Ryukyu begins”, which was used to describe the boundary between China and 
Ryukyu in Chen’s book.98 In addition, in 1708, Tei Junsoku, a noted scholar and the 
Grand Master with the Purple-Golden Ribbon (a government official) of Ryukyu, 
attached a map in his book A General Guide, which put Diaoyutai together with 
Huangwei and Chiwei Islands, forming a clear boundary line between Kume 
Island.99 These Ryukyuan historical accounts indicate that Chiwei and Huangwei 
Islands belong to the territory of China, while Kume Island belongs to Ryukyu, 
and that Hei Shui Gou (today’s Okinawa Trough), lying between Chiwei Island and 
Kume Island, constitutes the boundary line between the two States. The boundary 
of Ryukyuan territory can also be found in Japanese records. A perfect example 
in this case is the Map of the Three Provinces and 36 Islands of Ryukyu, which 
was attached in the book Sangoku Tsūran Zusetsu (An Illustrated Description of 
Three Countries) written by Hayashi Shihei (1783 – 1793).100 Historical documents 
of Ryukyu, including Chūzan Seifu, which was edited by Sai Taku and rewritten 
by his son Sai On, have all clearly depicted the boundary of Ryukyu Kingdom.101 
98  　 Zheng Hailin, The History of Diaoyu Islands and the Relevant Jurisprudence, Beijing: 
Zhonghua Book Company, 2007, p. 98. (in Chinese)
99  　 This map, in practice, best explained the following statements by Chinese envoys Chen 
Kan and Guo Rulin:  “Then Gumi Mountain comes into sight, that is where the land of 
Ryukyu begins”, and “Chi Yu is the mountain that marks the boundary of Ryukyu”. See 
Zheng Hailin, The History of Diaoyu Islands and the Relevant Jurisprudence, Beijing: 
Zhonghua Book Company, 2007, pp. 98~99. (in Chinese)
100　 Sangoku Tsūran Zusetsu (An Illustrated Description of Three Countries) by Hayashi 
Shihei was published in Japan in the Autumn of 1785. This illustrated book is attached 
with five maps, namely: Complete Picture of World Distances of the Outline of the Three 
Countries, Complete Picture of the Country of Ezo, Complete Picture of the Country of 
Korea, Picture of the Uninhabited Islands, and the Map of the Three Provinces and 36 
Islands of Ryukyu. See [Japan] Murata Tadayoshi, The Diaoyu Islands Disputes, Hundred 
Year Tide, No. 6, 2004, pp. 56~62. (in Chinese)
101　 According to Chūzan Seifu, the Ryukyu Island was composed of three principalities, 
five provinces and 15 prefectures (35 prefectures in fact). The three principalities 
were Chūzan, which was constituted of five provinces and 11 prefectures, Nanzan (15 
prefectures) and Hokuzan (9 prefectures). In addition to that, there were also 36 islands. 
See [Japan] Murata Tadayoshi, The Diaoyu Islands Disputes, Hundred Year Tide, No. 6, 
2004, pp. 56~62. (in Chinese)
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In a word, historical accounts and maps from the three States, China, Japan and 
Ryukyu, all show that, Ryukyuan islands do not include Diaoyu, Huangwei and 
Chiwei Islands, which was a common understanding among the three States. 
C. Japanese Claim of the Diaoyu Islands Being Terra Nullius Is 
    Ill-grounded in Historical Facts and International Law
Japan declared, “[f]rom 1885 on, surveys of the Senkaku Islands were 
thoroughly carried out by the Government of Japan … Through these surveys, 
it was confirmed that the Senkaku Islands had been uninhabited and showed no 
trace of having been under the control of the Qing Dynasty of China.”102 The 
Government of Japan has alleged for years that it has, in accordance with the 
principle of “occupation of terra nullius”, legally incorporated the Diaoyu Islands 
into its territory. In this regard, “surveys of the Senkaku Islands”, in the words of 
Japan, concerns the issue of history, and “occupation of terra nullius” is a question 
of international law. 
Japan maintained that it had conducted on-site surveys of the Senkaku Islands 
time and again since 1885, which, however, is contrary to the truth. Official 
documents of the Meiji Government confirm that, Japan only carried out one survey 
of the Diaoyu Islands in October 1885, where the Japanese merely landed on the 
Diaoyu Island, but not Huangwei and Chiwei Islands.103 Inoue Kaoru, Japan’s 
Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, came to know that the Diaoyu Islands 
“which are close to the national border of Qing China and adjacent to Taiwan 
102　 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku 
Islands, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/basic_view.html, 12 October, 
2016.
103　 The results of this survey can be seen in the Summary Report of Inspection of Uotsuri 
Island and Two Other Islands submitted by Ishizawa Heigo, and the Report of Vo-
yage to Uotsuri Island, Kuba Island, and Kumeakashima Island by Hayashi Tsuru-
matsu, the captain of the Ship Izumo Maru, to Mori Nagayoshi, the senior executive 
secretary of Okinawa Prefecture, who was acting on behalf of the Okinawa Governor 
Nishimura Sutezo. See [Japan] Murata Tadayoshi, The Origin of Sino-Japanese Territorial 
Disputes: the Diaoyu Islands Issue Seen from Historical Archives, translated by Wei 
Pinghe, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2013, pp. 166~169 (in Chinese); 
Li Li, Japan’s Illegal Investigation and Theft of Diaoyu Islands in Modern Times, Beijing: 
Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2013, pp. 12~14. (in Chinese)
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Island … belong to Qing China”.104 The document of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Japan (Qin Zhan No. 38) indicated that, Inoue Kaoru expressed its 
objection to the setting up of national sovereignty markers on the Diaoyu Islands, 
saying to the Home Minister Yamagata Aritomo: “At this time, if we were to 
publicly place national markers, this must necessarily invite China’s suspicion.”105 
This point can also be proved by the statement in an official document prepared 
by Nishimura Sutezo, the governor of the Okinawa Prefecture, on November 
24 of the same year: “since this matter is not unrelated to China, if conflicts do 
arise, please give me instructions on how to deal with them.”106 On November 30, 
1885, Japan’s Chancellor of the Realm Sanjō Sanetomi gave an order [Mi No. 
218(2)] to Inoue Kaoru, deciding to put off the setting of sovereignty markers.107 
The following evidences can substantiate this conclusion. First, documents unear-
thed from the Navy Ministry of Japan indicated, the governor of the Okinawa 
Prefecture Maruoka Kanji, on January 27, 1892, wrote to the Navy Minister 
Kabayama Sukenori, saying that “surveys of the Diaoyu Islands are incomple-
te”. Consequently, he requested that the naval ship Kaimon be sent to survey the 
islands, but ultimately the “bad weather” made it impossible for the survey to take 
place.108 Second, the Okinawa governor Narahara Shigeru wrote, in May of 1894, 
to the Home Ministry of Japan, confirming that ever since the islands were first 
investigated in 1885, there had been no subsequent field surveys conducted.109 After 
104　  An American Newspaper Article: Japan Should Respect the International Treaties 
concerning the Diaoyu Islands, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2012-10/22/
c_123850855.htm, 1 November 2016. (in Chinese)
105　 Construction of National Markers on the Kumeakashima Island, Kuba Island and Uotsuri 
Island of Okinawa Prefecture (JCAHR: B03041152300), Documents on Japanese Foreign 
Policy, Vol. 18, p. 572. (in Japanese)
106　 B03041152300 の 17, Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, Vol. 18, p. 576.
107　 Construction of National Markers on the Kumeakashima Island, Kuba Island and Uotsuri 
Island of Okinawa Prefecture (JCAHR: B03041152300), Documents on Japanese Foreign 
Policy, Vol. 18, p. 572. (in Japanese)
108　 Han-yi Shaw, The Inconvenient Truth Behind the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, The New York 
Times, 19 September 2012; “Ministry of Foreign Affairs” of Taiwan, Taiwan Government 
Response to the Diaoyutai Islands Q&A on the Website of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, at http://www.mofa.gov.tw/cp.aspx?n=FBFB7416EA72736F&s=FAA8620A0EE7
2A91, 30 January 2015. (in Chinese)
109　 Construction of National Markers on the Kumeakashima Island, Kuba Island and Uotsuri 
Island of Okinawa Prefecture (JCAHR: B03041152300) (in Japanese); Han-yi Shaw, 
The Inconvenient Truth Behind the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, The New York Times, 19 
September 2012; “Ministry of Foreign Affairs” of Taiwan, Taiwan Government Response 
to the Diaoyutai Islands Q&A on the Website of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at 
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/cp.aspx?n=FBFB7416EA72736F&s=FAA8620A0EE72A91, 30 
January 2015. (in Chinese)
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a number of Chinese defeats in the Sino-Japanese War (started in the August of 
1894), Japan’s Home Minister Nomura Yasushi, in December 1894, sent a secret 
document (Classified No. 133) to the Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu. On 
how to reply the request for setting up sovereignty markers on the Diaoyu Islands, 
which was submitted by the governor of Okinawa Prefecture a year ago for the 
third time, this document stated, “this matter has already been discussed with your 
ministry, and an order has been made … but the situation today is greatly different 
from back then.”110 The sentence “but the situation today is greatly different from 
back then”, completely uncovered the conspiracy of the Japanese Government to 
steal Chinese territory, by taking advantage of the First Sino-Japanese War, and also 
made it difficult for the Japanese to justify its claim that the Diaoyu Islands was 
irrelevant to the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The truth is that the Okinawa Prefecture 
only carried out a one-day survey on the Daito Islands and then placed markers on 
them.111 In contrast, the so-called “on-site surveys time and again” carried out by 
the authorities of Okinawa Prefecture and the Diaoyu Islands being terra nullius, 
are fictions made by the Japanese against China. Furthermore, the survey report 
prepared by the Okinawa Prefecture in 1885, titled Summary Report of Inspection 
110　 “B03041152300 の 29”, Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, Vol. 18.
111　 In June and July, 1885, the Home Ministry of Japan sent a secret order to Okinawa 
Governor Nishimura Sutezo, asking him to survey the Daito Islands located to the 
east of Okinawa Island. Ordered by Nishimura, on 29 August of the same year, a 
group led by Ishizawa Heigo landed on Minamidaito Island by the ship Izumo 
Maru. On 31 August, they came to the Kita-Daito Island, where they conducted field 
surveys, as ordered, and erected a national marker saying “under the jurisdiction of 
Okinawa Prefecture”. And Captain Hayashi Tsurumatsu set up a navigation mark, 
saying “under the order of the Okinawa Prefecture, Empire of Japan, Izumo Maru, 
a ship owned by Osaka Shosen, created this sea route for steamships”. Izumo 
Maru returned to the port of Naha on 1 September. See [Japan] Murata Tadayoshi, 
The Origin of Sino-Japanese Territorial Disputes: the Diaoyu Islands Issue Seen from 
Historical Archives, translated by Wei Pinghe, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press 
(China), 2013, pp. 150~152. (in Chinese)
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of Uotsuri Island and Two Other Islands,112 repetitiously mentioned “Hoa Pin 
Su” and “Tia u su”. These two names appearing on maps charted by British 
cartographers are, actually, names of the Diaoyu Islands given by the Chinese.113 
Under international law, acquisition of territory through occupation is an 
act of a State intending to place the territory which has never been subject to 
the sovereignty of any State, i.e., terra nullius, under its own sovereignty.114 
One prerequisite of occupation is that the land subject to occupation is terra
112　 Summary Report of Inspection of Uotsuri Island and Two Other Islands stated, “this 
island, when compared with the map of the sea areas between Japan and Taiwan published 
by Great Britain, refers to ‘Hoa Pin su’, which is recorded as ‘Tia u su’ on the map. The 
use of ‘Tia u su’ is actually a misnomer. ‘Kumeakashima Island’ refers to Raleigh Rock, 
which is merely a rock … The map also mistook ‘Pinnacle’ for ‘Kuba Island’. The word 
‘Pinnacle’ means “a high pointed piece of rock” … Therefore, these mistakes are hereby 
corrected: ‘Uotsuri Island’ should be recorded as ‘Hoa Pin Su’, ‘Kuba Island’ as ‘Tia u 
su’, and ‘Kumeakashima Island’ as ‘Raleigh Rock’.” Murata Tadayoshi pointed out that, 
Ishizawa Heigo, the submitter of the Summary Report, mistook “Hoa Pin Su” for “Uotsuri 
Island”. See [Japan] Murata Tadayoshi, The Origin of Sino-Japanese Territorial Disputes: 
the Diaoyu Islands Issue Seen from Historical Archives, translated by Wei Pinghe, Beijing: 
Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2013, p. 169. (in Chinese)
113　 Zheng Hailin, The History of Diaoyu Islands and the Relevant Jurisprudence, Beijing: 
Zhonghua Book Company, 2007, p. 75. (in Chinese) 
114　 The term “occupation” was translated into “ 占领 ” in the Chinese version of Op-
penheim’s International Law (9th edition), by scholars led by Wang Tieya, an interna-
tionalist from Chinese Mainland. However, this term was translated into “ 先
占 ” by Taiwanese internationalist Chiu Hungdah in his book Modern International 
Law (edited by Chan Shun-yee), when he quoted the wording concerning territorial 
disputes from the same edition of Oppenheim’s International Law. In the view of 
Chiu, in the context of territorial acquisition, “occupation” should be translated into 
“先占 ” in Chinese; however, under law of war, it should be translated into “占领 ”; 
they have different connotations. Sovereignty cannot be acquired through military 
occupation. The Chinese version of this paper adopted Chiu’s translation. See Chiu 
Hungdah, Modern International Law (3rd edition), edited by Chan Shun-yee, Taipei: 
San Min Book Co., Ltd., 2013, pp. 514~515 (in Chinese); Robert Jennings and Arthur 
Watts eds., Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. 1, No. 2, translated by Wang Tieya et al., 
Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 1998, pp. 74~79. (in Chinese)
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nullius,115 which belongs to no State. Such a piece of land is either uninha-
bited or inhabited by indigenous peoples that do not sustain social and politi-
cal organization qualified as a State.116 Although the doctrine of occupation is 
still used in modern international law, internationally accepted terra nullius is 
increasingly fewer. As a result, the influence and public acceptance of this doctrine 
is gradually declining. Moreover, occupation of territory should be effective 
rather than fictitious.117 The international law, in its early stage, failed to provide 
that to constitute an act of occupation, two requirements (possession and ad-
ministration) need to be met; instead, it asserted that discovery alone is suffi-
cient to create title of sovereignty. Nonetheless, international law theories 
and state practice in the 19th century uphold that only an effective occupa-
tion can acquire territorial sovereignty.118  
The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands,119 issued by
the Foreign Affairs of Japan in 1972, shows that the Japanese Government, based 
on the doctrine of the occupation of terra nullius, raised its claim to the sovereignty 
of Diaoyu Islands, and also alleged that the formal incorporation of the Diaoyu 
115　 Terra nullius is a prevailing concept of the international law in the 18th century, 
which was employed by European States to defend their colonial activities. The 
concept terra nullius in international law was expounded by Emmerich De Vattel, 
a renowned internationalist in the 18th century, in his book Le Droit des Gens. He 
justified British occupation of Oceania or European States’ occupation of the whole North 
America. He divided the land of indigenous peoples into two categories: cultivated or 
uncultivated. Vattel argued, the Europe-led international law should provide that humans 
were obliged to exploit and cultivate the land they inhabited and used. The failure of 
unsettled hordes to fulfill such an obligation implied that they had never “actually and 
legally” occupied these lands. Due to the lack of any recognizable forms of social leaders, 
these hordes cannot be considered as having occupied the lands under international law, 
which means that their lands were terra nullius. In that case, according to the principle of 
discovery and occupation, terrae nullius were open to all colonizers. See De Vattel, Les 
droit des Gens, ou Principles de la Loi naturelle, appliqués a la conduit at aux affaires des 
Nations et des Souverains (1758), translated by Charles Ghequiere Fenwick, Washington: 
Carnegie institution of Washington, 1916, p. 194. 
116　 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts eds., Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. 1, No. 2, 
translated by Wang Tieya et al., Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 1998, 
p. 74. (in Chinese)
117　 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts eds., Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. 1, No. 2, 
translated by Wang Tieya et al., Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 1998, 
p. 75. (in Chinese)
118　  Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. I, 9th ed., Harlow: 
Longmans Group UK Limited, 1992, pp. 689~690. 
119　  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku 
Islands, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/basic_view.html, 12 October 
2016.
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Islands into its territory was conducted through a legal procedure, i.e., through 
the adoption of a Cabinet Decision on 14 January 1895. However, is the concept 
“uninhabited island” identical with the concept of terra nullius in international 
law? Further, does the procedure that Japan relied on to incorporate the Diaoyu 
Islands into its territory comply with international law? 
First, albeit uninhabited, the Diaoyu Islands has been included in the 
coastal defense areas, and placed under the jurisdiction of Fujian Province, by
Chinese authorities ever since the Ming Dynasty. This act qualifies as an effective 
occupation. The surveys of uninhabited islands, including Daito Islands, carried 
out by the authorities of Okinawa Prefecture in the 19th century, showed that Japan 
possessed many uninhabited islands. However, the fact that an island is uninhabited 
does not imply that this island is subject to no owner or possessor, or an owner 
should be found for it. The Japanese Government gave up its intention to place 
national markers on the Diaoyu Islands in 1885, because it was knowledgeable of 
the relevance between these islands and Chinese Qing Empire. In that case, the 
Japanese Government cannot claim the sovereignty of these “uninhabited islands”, 
if it had not inquired the Qing Court about their sovereignty and received a reply 
from Qing Court, saying these islands “do not belong to Chinese territory”.120 In 
practice, at that time, the Japanese was not unaware of the principle that terra 
nullius should be confirmed and occupation thereof should be proclaimed. For 
example, when the Meiji Government incorporated Iwo Jima into its territory in 
1891, the incorporation was made public by the Imperial Decree No. 190 issued 
on 9 September of the same year, following the Cabinet Decision dated 19 August 
1891; and when the Meiji Government incorporated Minami-Tori-shima in 1898, 
the incorporation was publicized by the Official Gazette of Tokyo Prefecture (No. 
58) issued on 24 July of the same year, after the Cabinet Decision dated 1 July 
1898. These facts demonstrate that Japan’s clandestine occupation of the Diaoyu 
Islands deviated from international law and international customs and practices, 
and also from its domestic practices.121 
Second, Japan alleged that, by virtue of its Imperial Decree No. 13 concerning 
120　 [Japan] Murata Tadayoshi, The Origin of Sino-Japanese Territorial Disputes: the Diaoyu 
Islands Issue Seen from Historical Archives, translated by Wei Pinghe, Beijing: Social 
Sciences Academic Press (China), 2013, pp. 150~177. (in Chinese)
121　 “Ministry of Foreign Affairs” of Taiwan, Taiwan Government Response to the Diaoyutai 
Islands Q&A on the Website of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at http://www.mofa.
gov.tw/cp.aspx?n=FBFB7416EA72736F&s=FAA8620A0EE72A91, 30 January 2015. (in 
Chinese)
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the division of Okinawa Prefecture into several districts in 1896, the prefecture 
was divided into five districts. However, the decree said nothing about the Diaoyu 
Island and its affiliated islands, nor listed Diaoyu, Chiwei and other islands together 
with the Yaeyama Islands. That is to say, Diaoyu and Chiwei Islands had not been 
included in the Okinawa Prefecture by the Imperial Decree No. 13. Even after 
the end of the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese Government did not formally go 
through the procedure to take possession of the Diaoyu Islands.122 Additionally, 
the national markers approved to be erected on the Diaoyu Islands by the Cabinet 
Council, actually, had not been set up by the authorities of Okinawa Prefecture. 
In 1968, the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, 
also known as the “ECAFE”, issued a conclusive report on the seabed resources 
in the East China Sea. It is against this backdrop that the authorities of Ishigaki 
promptly placed boundary markers on the Diaoyu Island on 9 May 1969.123 
Furthermore, legal rights cannot derive from illegal acts. Two other documents 
can prove that Japanese claims are void ab initio. One is the Fishery Survey of 
Miyako and Yaeyama Districts, edited by the Aquaculture Technician (an official 
title) of Okinawa Prefecture in 1913. This Fishery Survey recorded the following 
facts about “Senkaku Islands”: Tatsushiro Koga intended to lease the islands 
from Japanese Government, but at that time, “it is said that these islands belong 
to Qing China, therefore, Koga has not received a reply from the government 
for a long time. However, with the advent of the Sino-Japanese War, resulting 
in the incorporation of Taiwan into Japanese territory, the ownership of these 
islands (Senkaku Islands) becomes clear.” This passage reveals that, prior to the 
incorporation of the Diaoyu Islands, the Meiji Government had already known that 
they were not terra nullius. The second document is the Government Gazette No. 
2507 dated 9 December 1920. This gazette includes two items: “the incorporation 
of territories whose ownership is uncertain” and their “naming”. Here, “territories 
whose ownership is uncertain” refer to Chiwei Island, which was renamed “Taishō-
tō” by the Japanese. It implies that Japan’s secret Cabinet Decision of 14 January 
1895 neither complied with its national law, nor the international law. Further, 
122　 [Japan] Murata Tadayoshi, The Origin of Sino-Japanese Territorial Disputes: the Diaoyu 
Islands Issue Seen from Historical Archives, translated by Wei Pinghe, Beijing: Social 
Sciences Academic Press (China), 2013, pp. 222~223. (in Chinese)
123　 [Japan] Murata Tadayoshi, The Origin of Sino-Japanese Territorial Disputes: the Diaoyu 
Islands Issue Seen from Historical Archives, translated by Wei Pinghe, Beijing: Social 
Sciences Academic Press (China), 2013, pp. 201~202. (in Chinese)
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when listing the territories to be incorporated, it contained such a major omission 
that Japan had to unilaterally incorporate Chiwei Island and renamed it as “Taishō-
tō” after 25 years upon the end of the Sino-Japanese War.124 
To sum up, one prerequisite of occupation is that the land subject to occu-
pation should be terra nullius, or land without owner. Second, in accordance with 
the general international law rules recognized by civilized States, the doctrine 
of effective occupation of terra nullius under international law requires that 
terra nullius should be confirmed and occupation thereof should be proclaimed, 
which are two indispensible requirements in this regard. Third, by virtue of the 
international law principle that a State cannot acquire legal rights or entitlements 
through unlawful acts or omissions, Japan’s stealing of Diaoyu Islands, as an illegal 
act, cannot be served as the ground to obtain legal rights. Great volumes of facts 
demonstrate that Japan’s claims to the sovereignty of Diaoyu Islands by invoking 
the doctrine of occupation of terra nullius, is not well grounded.  
V. Conclusions
This paper argues, taking into account of the history of the pre-modern 
Ryukyu and the international law of the 19th century, represented by the Elements 
of International Law, Ryukyu should be defined as a sovereign State, even in the 
period when it was subordinated both to China and Japan. 
First, the historical status of Ryukyu can be examined by reviewing its own 
history and other tributary States under the same tributary system with Ryukyu. 
Chronologically, the historical status of Ryukyu may be discussed in three stages. 
In the period before the Satsuma’s invasion of Ryukyu in 1609 (Stage 1), Ryukyu 
was an independent Kingdom, which is without much debate among the historians 
of many States. In the period between 1609 and 1872, also called “the period of 
dual subordination” (Stage 2), whether Ryukyu was an independent Kingdom, 
is full of opposing views. In this stage, Ryukyu not only retained its political 
institutions and reign title, but also had diplomatic and trade exchanges with its 
Asian neighbors, including the Japanese shogunate. From 1854 to 1859, Ryukyu, in 
the name of a sovereign State under modern international law, signed commercial 
treaties with the U.S., France and the Netherlands. More importantly, in order to 
124　 Han-yi Shaw, The Inconvenient Truth Behind the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, The New York 
Times, 19 September 2012 
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seek gains from Sino-Ryukyuan trades, both Satsuma and Ryukyu deliberately 
hid the relations between them from the international community, including 
China. Viewed from the history of the diplomatic relations between China, Japan 
and Ryukyu, and from international law, Japan cannot acquire the sovereignty 
over Ryukyu through Satsuma’s invasion of the latter, therefore, it is true to say: 
Ryukyu was subordinated both to China and Japan, and simultaneously remained 
an independent Kingdom. In the third stage, that is the period from 1872 to 1880 
when the Sino-Japanese negotiations about Ryukyu were conducted, the status of 
Ryukyu was pending. The frequent diplomatic negotiations between China and 
Japan over the ownership of Ryukyu, and the mediation or good offices offered by 
some third State to settle the Sino-Japanese dispute over Ryukyu in this Stage, as 
well as the draft treaty with regards to the division of the Ryukyu Islands and the 
revision of the treaty concerned in 1880 (which was not signed by Qing Court at 
the end), all prove that the status of Ryukyu was pending at this stage. Additionally, 
around the time Japan and China were negotiating, Qing Court also negotiated with 
the major powers of Europe concerning the other three tributaries, Korea, Vietnam 
and Burma. Different from the case of Ryukyu, the change of the legal status of 
these three tributary States had been confirmed through treaties, and acknowledged 
by their suzerainty – China. In contrast, from 1879 when Japan annexed Ryukyu 
by violence, to the end of World War II, Japan and China failed to reach any formal 
agreements with respect to the change of the sovereignty over Ryukyu and the 
arrangement for Ryukyuan territories, except some negotiations over the draft 
treaty concerning the division of the Ryukyu Islands in 1880. More importantly, 
those tributaries (other than Ryukyu) under Chinese tributary system, had freed 
themselves from colonial rule, and now become independent States in the UN 
framework. 
Second, based on the doctrine of intertemporal law, the international law 
status of Ryukyu should be viewed in the eye of modern and contemporary 
international law. As we know, Elements of International Law, by Henry Wheaton, 
is a masterpiece, representing modern international law. When Japan and Qing 
were negotiating over the Ryukyu issue, the status of Ryukyu in the period of 
dual subordination became a focus of contention, where China, Japan and Ryukyu 
all invoked the book Elements of International Law as legal grounds to support 
their own arguments. In accordance with the theories concerning sovereignty and 
legal persons contained in the said book, Ryukyu’s dual subordination to China 
and Japan, did not contradict with its status of being an independent Kingdom. 
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However, after 1879, when Ryukyu was annexed by Japan and incorporated into its 
territories, Ryukyu became a colony of the latter, which impaired the sovereignty 
of Ryukyu. This is an undeniable truth. Following Japan’s annexation of Ryukyu 
in 1879, many Ryukyuans fled to Qing China, seeking to restore the kingdom, 
and the “restoration movement” was also staged in the homeland of Ryukyu, 
which vividly manifest the resistance from Ryukyuans. Furthermore, China, being 
the suzerainty of Ryukyu, had never publicly recognized the legality of Japan’s 
annexation. Japan’s occupation of Ryukyu in the period between 1879 and the end 
of World War II, actually, is a kind of conquest in light of the theories of territorial 
acquisition under international law. Nevertheless, the Japanese cannot, by virtue 
of its conquest, evade the truth that the legal status of Ryukyu at that time was 
uncertain. In addition, according to the modern international trusteeship system, 
China and the U.S., in the Cairo Conference of 1943, agreed to joint administration 
of Ryukyu by the two States under the trusteeship of an international organization. 
However, after the end of the World War II, Ryukyu was under the de facto 
administration of the U.S. alone. Thereafter, despite the desire of many inhabitants 
of the Ryukyu Islands for independence, the U.S., through signing the Okinawa 
Reversion Agreement of 1971, “returned” the power of administration of Ryukyu 
to Japan, which severely violated the four principles of international trusteeship 
and the juridical logic of trust law in the trusteeship system. At the meantime, in 
view of the concept of “residual sovereignty”, Japan only obtained the power of 
administration rather than sovereignty of Ryukyu.125 
In conclusion, during the time from 1372 to 1879, Ryukyu, being a tributary 
State of China, was a sovereign State under international law. Japan’s annexation of 
Ryukyu by violence was resisted by the inhabitants on the islands, whose legality 
had never been publicly recognized by China, the suzerainty of Ryukyu. Therefore, 
it is well grounded to consider the legal status of Ryukyu uncertain in this 
period. Due to the uncertainty of Ryukyu’s own legal status, Japan’s claim to the 
sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, based on the assertion that the Diaoyu Islands 
belonged to Ryukyu, must be ill-founded and unjustified.
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